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INTRODUCTION
One night, you, a lonely psychology professor at an Ivy League uni-
versity, are working late.' From somewhere in the darkness, a voice
saunters into your head.2 The voice then informs you that it is Jesus.'
Sufficiently bewildered, you listen further as Jesus asks you to act as His
scribe.4 Not one to thumb your nose at Jesus, you oblige.5
Soon you have amassed hundreds of pages, which, after editing,
comprise the religious text itself, a workbook, and a manual.6 After some
initial reluctance, you allow these materials to be copied and distributed
with little to no restriction.' But quickly, and much to your dismay, nu-
merous unauthorized versions and compilations appear.8  This
contravenes Jesus' command to reveal the works only as a complete set.9
To prevent any further distortions, Jesus instructs you to protect the
works more closely by seeking copyright protection.' Once again, you
follow his command to keep the doctrine pure."
Or perhaps you are not a psychology professor through whom a di-
vine being spoke, but merely an ordinary disciple of a religion. You
practice your religion, as do nearly all its adherents, by using the writ-
ings of your religion's founder, which are viewed as sacred and precise."
I. This is how one might imagine the author of the religious works in Penguin Books
U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor (NCCFE), No. 96-4126, 2000 WL
1028634, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000), vacated, No. 96-4126, 2004 WL
906301 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 27, 2004). The facts described in the next two paragraphs are drawn
from this case.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *3.
7. Id. at *3-4.
8. Id. at *4, *6 ("One result of our lax policy was the appearance of a number of
abridgements and poetic compilations of passages excerpted from the Course. In fact, these
directly contravened Jesus' very specific instructions to Helen that the three books should
never be separated from each other, nor should any of the material appear out of context in
abridged form. The Course's curriculum is by its very nature an integrated and self-contained
one. Therefore, any attempts to abridge or 'short cut' the process of teaching and learning
forgiveness could only prove detrimental, and would alter the very essence of the Course both
as a theoretical thought system and a process of spiritual development.").
9. Id.
10. Id. ("It was not until the early 1980s that we began to appreciate the wisdom behind
Jesus' insistence on obtaining a copyright. At that time a number of unauthorized translations
of 'A Course in Miracles' were beginning to appear worldwide. Many of these were, to say the
very least, inaccurate, leading to unacceptable distortions of the Course's central teachings.").
II. Id. at *4, *7.
12. The facts in this and the following paragraph are adopted from numerous cases
involving the religion of Scientology, including New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group,
904 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Indeed, the religion claims that catastrophic harm will result from unsu-
pervised exposure to these texts." For that reason, they are kept secret. '"
One member, however, has defected and begun to criticize the relig-
ion, its founder, and its theology."s These criticisms often take the form
of written expressions, which use parts of the founder's written works.'6
Viewing this act as a transgression of and an affront to your religion, you
galvanize your religious organization, which holds the copyrights to the
founder's writings.' 7 The organization decides the best way to censor the
former member's heresy is to sue him for copyright infringement.
8
These scenarios represent the two primary reasons that religious or-
ganizations use copyright law: to preserve doctrinal purity and to censor
others. This Article first explores these two objectives of religious or-
ganizations, detailing how such motivations take shape in the courts.
Given these religious motivations for pursuing and enforcing copyright
protection, this Article asks the following normative question: should
religious organizations use copyright law to achieve these aims?' 9
13. This is one of the reasons the Church of Scientology asserted infringement in Reli-
gious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1986), and Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma II), No. 95-1107, 1996 WL 633131, at * I (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996).
14. Lermall, 1996 WL 633131, at *1.
15. Carol Publ'g, 904 F.2d at 154.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 154-55.
18. Id.
19. Perhaps the conflict described in this Article results from copyright being "liberal in
the classic sense." E-mail from Rebecca Tushnet, Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center (May 26, 2009, 18:30 CST) (on file with author). Nomi Maya Stolzenberg ex-
plored the legal conflict between liberalism and fundamentalism in her article, "He Drew a
Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Educa-
tion, 106 HARv. L. REV. 581 (1993). Stolzenberg's article focuses on the problems law has
with recognizing fundamentalist claims as they relate to education. Id. at 613-632. In particu-
lar, she noted how the fundamentalist "challenge to 'secular humanism' and 'liberalism'
represents an attack on the entire worldview of modernity-a worldview that emphasizes the
ascendancy of reason over social conditioning and 'superstition.'" Id. at 614. Fundamentalists
argue that the objective nature of liberalism "'brackets the truth question,' and deals instead
with personal, subjective beliefs." Id. at 632. In essence, Stolzenberg argues that the current
jurisprudential outlook "confirms the implicit reliance of constitutional doctrine on the subjec-
tivist model of religion." Id.
Copyright law does not seem to conflict with fundamentalists or religions in the way
Stolzenberg describes. Of course, the views of fundamentalists, such as "biblical errancy"-
"a radical emphasis on the divine authorship of all of the letters of the Scripture[, including
its authorized translations"-diverge from the goals of copyright law. Id. at 615. Also, copy-
right law does more than merely "bracket the question of truth"-it rejects any claims of
"truth or falsity," though it does recognize the difference between factual and fictional works.
E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (discussing the idea/expression dichotomy
and noting that facts can be used at will because they are not copyrightable); id. (discussing
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To date, no scholar has attempted to answer that precise question. A
few scholars have done an excellent job exploring the intersection be-
tween religion and copyright. Thomas Cotter, for example, has published
two probing and insightful pieces that analyzed current copyright law
vis-i-vis religion and proposed amending or creating legal concepts to
accommodate religion. ° Thomas Berg has explored the problems that
would arise if copyright law granted an exemption to religious works.2'
Meanwhile, one comment has analyzed the current treatment of religious
claims in copyright. 2 What all of these pieces have in common is a focus
on "religious uses" of copyright. While all of these authors, some more
than others, touch on religious groups' motivations for using copyright
law,23 none of them examine this issue in great depth.
The goal of this Article is to do what others have not: determine
whether religious organizations should use copyright law to advance
their goals of censorship and doctrinal purity. Answering this question
entails a two-step analysis. First, the religious motivations must be com-
pared with the underlying theories of, or justifications for, copyright law.
Whether those principles align or conflict with religious motivations will
"the 'fair use' defense," and stating that it "allows the public to use not only facts and ideas
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances"); Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (discussing the idea/expression
dichotomy and noting that, as to a "factual compilation, assuming the absence of original
written expression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw
facts may be copied at will"); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) ("In general, fair
use is more likely to be found in factual works than in fictional works."). Indeed, copyright
law is content neutral-it does not, theoretically speaking, assert or assess the value of par-
ticular beliefs insofar as they can be valued independent of their "originality."
Even if religious organizations view content neutrality as damaging, I doubt that many re-
ligions view copyright law as completely adverse to their interests or antithetical to their
religions. As this Article shows, the economic motivation for copyright law aligns with some
religious motivations for creating or using religious works. See infra Part III.A. I. That being said,
there may be some merit to the view that conflicts do emanate from the ideologically neutral
nature of copyright law. That view must be tempered by the fact that religious organizations are
using, or attempting to use, copyright law to protect their religious texts.
20. Thomas F Cotter, Accommodating the Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Works for
Religious Purposes Under the Fair Use Doctrine and Copyright Act § 110(3), 22 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 43 (2004); Thomas F Cotter, Gutenberg's Legacy: Copyright, Censorship,
and Religious Pluralism, 91 CAL. L. REv. 323 (2003).
21. See generally Thomas Berg, Copyright for Religious Reasons: A Comment on Prin-
ciples of Copyright and Religious Freedom, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 287 (2003)
(analyzing religious claims in copyright and discussing a possible religious exemption for
copyright law).
22. Chris Heinss, Comment, Beyond the Smoke and Mirrors: Defeating the Urge to
Nullify or Glorify Religious Copyright Law, 33 CuMB. L. REV. 677 (2003) (exploring the in-
tersection between religious rights and copyright law, reviewing the cases that have touched
on this issue, and arguing that there should be no separate "religious" standard for copyright
law using the mantra, "copyright law is copyright law, and infringement is infringement").
23. See, e.g., Walter A. Effross, Owning Enlightenment: Proprietary in the "New Age"
Marketplace, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 483 (2003).
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inform our normative answer. Regardless of the answer to the aforemen-
tioned inquiry, the second step analyzes whether substantive copyright
law doctrine facilitates or impedes the achievement of the ends advanced
by these religious motivations.
As a result of this analysis, this Article finds that these religious mo-
tivations for pursuing and enforcing copyright protection are antithetical
to its foundational principles. Not only do these religious motivations
run counter to the basic theory of copyright law, they directly conflict
with specific copyright doctrines that exist today. Therefore, this Article
argues that copyright law is an inadequate tool for "protecting" religion
or members of a religion. Although inadequate, copyright law can aid
religious goals in some instances. Those instances, however, are
drowned out by the foundational and doctrinal noise that religions must
mute to protect their religious works. This analysis shows that copyright
is not designed to address many concerns of religious organizations.
Therefore, it should not be used to advance the religious motivations of
censorship and doctrinal purity.
Part I explains the reasons that religious organizations might employ
copyright law. To accomplish this task, this Part reviews literature and
case law. From those two sources, this Article deduces that among these
motivations, two are the most prominent: (1) censoring spiritual dissen-
tion, denigration, or criticism and (2) maintaining doctrinal purity.
Part II of this Article explores the interaction between religious mo-
tivations for seeking copyright protection and the underlying principles
of copyright law. To achieve this objective, this Part explains three theo-
ries of copyright: economic theory, property rights theory, and cultural
theory. After explaining each theory, this Part examines whether the reli-
gious motivations identified in Part I harmonize or clash with the
principles underlying each theory. This discussion focuses heavily on the
property rights theory of copyright because many religious organizations
frame their motivations in natural law terms.
Part III recounts the doctrinal obstacles that copyright presents for
religious organizations and the achievement of their goals. To do this,
this Part explains several copyright doctrines and explicates how they
prevent religious organizations from achieving their goals. Among the
doctrines examined are originality, the merger doctrine, and fair use. Part
III concludes that copyright law doctrines do not facilitate the achieve-
ment of censorship and doctrinal purity.
Based on the analysis in Parts II and III, the Article concludes that
religious organizations' attempts to censor and preserve doctrinal purity
are wrongheaded. Therefore, religious organizations should not use
copyright law to achieve these aims.
Spring 20 101
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I. RELIGIONS' REASONS FOR PURSUING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Religious organizations are litigating their copyright claims. 24 The
legal issues of these cases, however, do not address the fundamental
question underlying them: why are religious organizations using copy-
right law at all? Religious organizations may seek protection for
numerous reasons,2 5 such as for money or to protect its members.26 This
Part explores the various reasons for this phenomenon. After reviewing
these reasons, it focuses on the most prominent, justifiable, and identifi-
able reasons that motivate religious groups to seek copyright protection.
This Part concludes that, although religious organizations may seek
copyright protection for manifold reasons, including economic ones,
they use copyright law primarily to preserve doctrinal purity and censor
others.27 While this Part examines reasons besides these two motivations,
it emphasizes them because they appear most prominently in the case
law. Additionally, these two motivations are used in the following Part to
examine whether they dovetail with the goals of copyright law.
A. Economic Motivations, Secrecy, and Identity
Some religions might seek copyright protection, and litigate copy-
right infringement cases, because they seek money. Sinkler v. Goldsmith
illustrates this motivation. In Sinkler, Joel Goldsmith founded a "non-
traditional, non-structured spiritual movement" called, "The Infinite
Way" in 1947.29 Lorraine Sinkler met Goldsmith in 1949 and became his
student.30 Until Goldsmith's death in 1964, Sinkler and Goldsmith ex-
changed "hundreds of letters" and wrote, edited, and published a number
of articles together.3' Goldsmith even asked Sinkler to edit and collabo-
rate on rewriting a transcript of Goldsmith's recording entitled, "The
Easter of Our Lives."32 After Goldsmith's death, Sinkler used many re-
cordings of Goldsmith's classes as source material for a newsletter she
published.33 Goldsmith's widow, Emma, entered into an agreement re-
24. See the cases discussed infra this Part.
25. Effross, supra note 23, at 646-664 (arguing that religious organizations may use
copyright law to protect their members and students of the religion).
26. Id. at 647-677.
27. The works that religious organizations seek to protect in this regard typically are the
works underlying the religion itself. Put another way, they are the works upon which the relig-
ion is based.
28. Sinkler v. Goldstein, 623 F. Supp. 727 (D. Ariz. 1985).
29. Id. at 729-30.
30. Id. at 730.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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garding the newsletter and other works produced using Goldsmith's writ-1 4
ings . The apparent purpose of the agreement was to provide income for
Emma."-
Other cases confirm that fights over religious texts, while not always
between strictly religious entities, often are economic in nature. 6 In one
of these cases, Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch,
Inc., the plaintiff-a publishing arm of a corporation representing a Ha-
sidic group--sought an injunction against another publisher of religious
materials, the sole owner of which was a former employee of the plain-
tiff." The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed its copyright
in "a new version of Siddur Tehillat Hashem, a prayerbook," by copying
and disseminating it. 38 A later district court opinion finding the defendant
in contempt shows that this dispute was not one over religious doctrine:
the plaintiff was not concerned with the use or copying of the work per
se. Instead, the plaintiff was concerned with copying and dissemination
without payment.
In spite of monetary undertones such as those in Sinkler and Merkos,
this Article argues that the vast majority of religious organizations seek
not monetary gain, but spiritual or religious consonance. For example,
religious organizations also might use copyright law to protect their
identity.40 This motivation, however, seems to be peripheral to religious
organizations, mainly because trademark law lends itself to protecting
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d
94, 96 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam); F.E.L. Publ'ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 754
F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1985); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); Wihtol v. Wells, 231
F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956); Neva, Inc. v. Christian Duplications Int'l, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1533
(M.D. Fla. 1990); F.E.L. Publ'ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 506 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.
III. 1981), rev'd 214 U.S.P.Q. 409 (7th Cir. 1982); F.E.L. Publ'ns, Ltd. v. Nat'l Conference of
Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034, 1037-39 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
37. See Merkos, 312 F.3d at 96.
38. Id.
39. Merkos L'lnyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 2004 WL 2550313,
at *1-2, *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2004) (finding, among other things, the work at issue pro-
duced large revenues and that the defendant's revision of the work amounted "to nothing more
than a copy of the [the plaintiff's work] in flimsy disguise").
40. See Jill Koren Kelley, Owning the Sun: Can Native Culture Be Protected Through
Current Intellectual Property Law?, 7 J. HIGH TEct-. L. 180, 189 (2007) (discussing how
Native American cultural property, including religious symbols and stories, exists in perpetu-
ity under Native American law, which embodies "the idea that certain works are of unique
cultural significance and their value is best preserved through continual control of their use");
Suzanne Milchan, Note, Whose Rights Are These Anyway?-A Rethinking of Our Society's
Intellectual Property Laws in Order to Better Protect Native American Religious Property, 28
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 157, 161-62 (2004) (noting that Native American cultural identity is tied
to its religious property and advocating a relativist application of copyright law).
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identity better than copyright law.4' Furthermore, most of the cases re-
garding religious copyright do not touch explicitly on identity, though it
certainly plays a role in the protection and enforcement of copyrights by
religious organizations.
Another reason religious organizations may use copyright law is to
keep their religions secret.4 2 Religious groups may not want to disclose
their works to protect the general public,43 students, teachers, or teaching
techniques.4 Scientology is a religion that has attempted to keep the de-
tails of its religion secret, though its reasons for doing so are
multifarious. In Religious Technology Center v. Lerma 1,4 a Church of
Scientology organization (COS), 6 which held the license to the copy-
rights of L. Ron Hubbard, Scientology's founder, sued for a temporary
restraining order to prevent a former member from posting Scientology
writings on the Internet.7 COS alleged copyright infringement and trade
secret misappropriation.48 In assessing the trade secret claims, the court
commented:
Unquestionably, the plaintiff has taken extraordinary measures
to try to maintain the secrecy of the [copyrighted texts]. Plaintiff
and the Church of Scientology employ numerous and elaborate
security measures to prevent church members from removing the
texts from the Church. In addition, while the California court file
remained unsealed, Church members conducted a daily vigil in
which they signed out the file and retained it until the Clerk's of-
fice closed. 9
Religious organizations also may desire secrecy to protect their stu-
dents. Walter Effross hypothesizes that some "spiritualities" can harm a
student who learns them because it may shake the student's epistemo-
41. See David A. Simon, Register Trademarks and Keep the Faith: Trademarks. Relig-
ion, and Identity, 49 IDEA 233, 236-40 (2009).
42. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma 1), 897 F. Supp. 260, 266 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(stating that "[u]nquestionably, the plaintiff has taken extraordinary measures to try to main-
tain the secrecy of [its] ... texts").
43. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma II), No. 95-1107, 1996 WL 633131, at *1
(E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996) (stating that the Scientology "Church doctrine teaches that improper
disclosure of the [works at issue], both to non-Scientologists and even to church members if
done prematurely . .. risks ... harm of global proportions").
44. Effross, supra note 23, at 664-677.
45. Lerma 1, 897 F Supp. at 266.
46. For the sake of ease, this Article will refer to the Church of Scientology and related
organizations like the one in Lerma as "COS."
47. Id. at 262. COS also sued, among others, the Washington Post, which had published
an article that contained brief quotations from some of the copyrighted materials. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 266.
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logical foundations. Some religions posit that an individual cannot fully
experience the religion through text alone, and, therefore, the text must
be kept secret to test students' will, memory, and understanding. Simi-
larly, a religion may require "tailoring" to specific students, 2 perhaps to
aid their spiritual development. -" Or, maybe secrecy is part and parcel of,
or necessary to the practice of, the religion itself.
4
Again, Scientology illustrates many of these reasons. Scientologists
may keep their religious texts secret because disclosure would render the
religion ineffectual. That is what COS argued in Religious Technology
Center v. Lerma H. Instead of a temporary restraining order (at issue in
Lerma I), the issue was a motion for summary judgment on a copyright
infringement claim. 5 Prior to discussing the merits of the case, the court
noted why COS sought to protect these documents: "the texts at issue
... allegedly provide a detailed program for warding off these evil influ-
ences through the creation of 'free zones.' ,56 According to COS, to have
the desired effect, these documents must "be [disclosed and] executed
precisely according to the procedures laid out by Hubbard and under the
guidance of an assisting church official. '"" If they are disclosed prema-
turely to anyone, member or non-Scientologist, they will not have the
desired effect."8 In fact, "[u]nauthorized disclosure also risks further
harm of global proportions."'
50. Effross, supra note 23, at 649 ("Less colorfully, even a beginning student of a spiri-
tual group might become distressed when led, either by lectures or by physical or mental
exercises, to reexamine her basic philosophical assumptions. In fact, some spiritual groups
maintain that even the seemingly best-adjusted people are unaware of potentially shattering
realities."). See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 1986)
("The unsupervised, premature exposure of an adherent to these materials will produce a spiri-
tually harmful effect.").
5I. Effross, supra note 23, at 656-58 ("Modem spiritual groups' references to 'training'
their participants imply that the transformative nature of their material requires experiencing it
personally and directly, and internalizing the realizations gained." (citations omitted)).
52. Id. at 653 (stating that some religions, such as Sufis, Kabbalists, and Gurdjieff,
require "prescription of specific exercises").
53. Id. at 660 ("The experiences and circumstances that a student encounters in such
contexts may have been deliberately designed to aid in her spiritual growth... ").
54. Id. at 652 ("Secrecy requirements may themselves be seen as a method of enhanc-
ing the spiritual discipline of students, forcing them to be more conscious and to conserve
energy that would otherwise be dissipated in discussing experiences and teachings, particu-
larly those they might not yet have fully assimilated.").
55. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma II), No. 95-1107, 1996 WL 633131, at * I
(E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. ("Church doctrine teaches that improper disclosure of the [works], both to non-
Scientologists and even to church members if done prematurely, prevents achievement of the
desired effect.)'
59. Id.
Spring 2010]
364 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review IVol. 16:355
Scientologists have emphasized the "harm" disclosure of their relig-
ion would cause in other cases, as well. In Religious Technology Center
v. Wollersheim, COS sought an injunction against a splinter group's use
of its documents, claiming the use violated the Racketeer Influenced and
Corruption Organization Act (RICO) and constituted a misappropriation
of trade secrets.60 In describing COS doctrine, the court noted that
"[COS] assert[ed] that the unsupervised, premature exposure of an ad-
herent to these materials will produce a spiritually harmful effect. '6' It
also noted that, to prevent this harm, "[COS] [kept] the higher level ma-
terials in secure places, and [made] the materials available only to
adherents who agree[d] in writing to maintain their confidentiality.
62
A similar harm-centered justification was given for copyright en-
forcement in Penguin Books U.S.A. v. New Christian Church of Full
Endeavor (NCCFE).3 The original creator of the work-who, at the time
of the statement, also was the copyright owner-stated that her relaxed
copyright enforcement gave rise to distortions of the work.M This was
problematic because "[tihe [work's] curriculum is by its very nature an
integrated and self-contained one. Therefore, any attempts to abridge or
'short cut' the process of teaching and learning forgiveness could only
[sic] prove detrimental, and would alter the very essence of the [work]
both as a theoretical thought system and a process of spiritual develop-
ment."
65
The NCCFE case touched on another reason Effross gives for reli-
gious secrecy: protecting teachers and religious doctrine. Effross
suggests religious organizations keep works secret to ensure that no one
misrepresents the doctrine or pursues self-interested goals, such as unau-
thorized teaching.6  Religions also may seek to prevent the
"desanctification" of the materials. Desanctification is the process by
60. 796 F.2d 1076, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1986).
61. Id. at 1077.
62. Id. at 1078; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Srvs., 923
F. Supp. 1231, 1238 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("The Church asserts that the unsupervised, prema-
ture exposure of an adherent to these materials will produce a spiritually harmful effect."
(quoting Wollershein)).
63. 2000 WL 1028634, at *6.
64. Id. ("One result of our lax policy was the appearance of a number of abridgements
and poetic compilations of passages excerpted from the Course. In fact, these directly contra-
vened Jesus' very specific instructions to Helen that the three books should never be separated
from each other, nor should any of the material appear out of context in abridged form.").
65. Id.
66. Effross, supra note 23, at 665-66 (noting that teachers have carefully evaluated
material for students, and that having a teacher pursing self-interested goals may distort the
teachings' meaning). Unauthorized use of religious names that qualify as trademarks may fall
into this category as well. See Simon, supra note 41, at 264-95.
67. Effross, supra note 23, at 666 (describing the prevention of desanctification as a
goal of spiritual secrecy).
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which religious techniques or texts that have therapeutic value are com-
mercialized and used primarily for the therapeutic effects, 8 rather than
for religious purposes.9
Additionally, secrecy might be sought to prevent "premature publi-
cation."70 This reason resembles the rationale that protects the student
who may not be able to fully comprehend the work: "for pedagogical or
other reasons, the equivalent of bicycles 'training wheels' might have
been inserted into the teachings or techniques," with later versions re-
vealing more of the secret text]' This concept certainly is plausible, and
law schools use it to teach students about nearly every subject. Indeed,
almost every discipline utilizes this approach in some respect. In mathe-
matics, for example, students must learn basic principles, like addition
and subtraction, before they can perform more advanced tasks, such as
solving algebraic equations.
Effross suggests two final teacher-centered reasons for secrecy: pre-
vention of ridicule and maintenance of lineage.7" The former
68. Id. at 667 (discussing how "[tihe desanctification of the primarily spiritual into the
merely therapeutic has also been condemned by a Tibetan Buddhist meditation teacher as
,spiritual materialism' ").
69. Desanctification is a type of exploitation where a nonreligious organization com-
modifies (and secularizes) a religious product. Trademark law contains two doctrines that
prevent individuals from using scandalous or disparaging marks. See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v.
Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 125 (D.D.C. 2003). Uses of scandalous or disparaging trademarks
often come closer to desanctification than the copyright abuses described in this Article.
Desanctification may seem to be a concern directed at only nonreligious groups that use
religious works. This process, however, does not require that the exploitation secularize the
religious work. Another religious group could commodify the work by exploiting it in a reli-
gious manner; for instance, it could sell the religious text for profit, or use the text during its
services such that it, in some way, generates profits for the organization. Brian D. Wassom
acknowledges as much in his article, Unforced Rhythms of Grace: Freeing Houses of Worship
From the Specter of Copyright Infringement Liability, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 61, 128-77 (2005). Wassom spends a considerable amount of time detailing how the
use of copyrighted materials has been a boon to religious organizations everywhere. Id. at
128-38, 150-70.
Thus, because religious organizations use copyrighted materials so frequently, they may
derive benefits from such use in a number of ways. Religious organizations could, for exam-
ple, receive donations from their members, who may attend services in which the copyrighted
religious texts are used. In this way, the texts themselves, which contain religious doctrine or
other practical information, are being used to generate money for the organization. The point
is that money need not be generated solely by selling the works themselves for them to be
desanctified.
70. Effross, supra note 23, at 668.
71. Id.
72. In the first-year contracts course, for example, professors often use this method.
The professor may teach remedies first, using cases that discuss aspects of contract law that
students do not yet fully understand. Only later, after progressing through offer, acceptance,
consideration, the Statute of Frauds, and the like, do students begin to comprehend how each
contract issue fits with the others.
73. Id. at 672-74.
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encapsulates the idea that it is impossible to criticize the substance of
something that is unknown.74 The latter means that religions want to
"identify and maintain the lineage of a spiritual tradition or practice."75
This often entails the approval of a centralized or respected authority. 6
While the primary objective is secrecy, these goals also suggest that re-
ligions desire to censor the use of materials and maintain their doctrinal
purity.
B. Censorship and Doctrinal Purity
Indeed, the two main reasons that religious organizations use copy-
right law are to censor others' uses of their works and to protect the
purity of their religious doctrine as embodied in their text(s). While both
of these views focus on controlling the copyrighted work, they are con-
ceptually different. Censorship is focused on preventing others from
using the work; religious organizations desire to censor others' use of
their works to prevent negative publicity, to prevent criticism, or to de-
stroy competition for members. Doctrinal purity, on the other hand, is
not concerned with others' use of the work per se; rather, it is concerned
with maintaining the religious coherency and consistency of the work. In
both cases, though, religious organizations view copyright law as a tool
that they can use to achieve these goals. 7
74. Id. at 672.
75. Id. at 673.
76. Id.; Simon, supra note 41, at 250-51.
77. In a way, the issue is one of control. The desire by copyright owners to exercise
control over their works is not specific to religious works. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 641 F.
Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (entering a preliminary injunction in a suit by original author
J.D. Salinger against the writer of a book that retells The Catcher in the Rye from the perspec-
tive of Holden Caulfield "sixty years" after the story in the original work), vacated, No. 09-
2878, 2010 WL 1729126 (2nd Cir. Apr 30, 2010); Neil Weinstock Netanel, COPYRIGHT'S
PARADOX I 11-16 (2008) (describing how copyright as a form of censorship can burden
speech); Dave ltzkoff, Author Responds to Salinger Lawsuit, ArtsBeat: The Culture at Large,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/author-responds-to-
salinger-lawsuit/?hp (explaining that J.D. Salinger sued Fredrik Colting, the author of 60 Years
Later: Coming Through the Rye, which he described as "a transformative exposition about one
of our nation's most famous authors, J.D. Salinger, and his best known creation, Holden Caul-
field"). Nevertheless, the nature of religious claims to copyright-i.e., a claim of divine right
to control-makes this issue different from these claims in other spaces of copyright law.
Additionally, even if one concludes religious infringement claims are not different from oth-
ers, the analysis in this Article applies to other claims that seek to censor others or preserve
their work's "doctrine." Finally, this Article observes that, in nearly every area of law, organi-
zations and entities will attempt to bastardize the law for their benefit. This Article, however,
focuses only on how religious organizations use the law in ways that may conflict with copy-
right law.
In Search of (Maintaining) the Truth
1. Censorship
Religious organizations may use copyright law to censor or suppress
viewpoints that compete with, oppose, or are critical of their religion.
This motivation can be called "censorship motivation." This motivation
has three basic objectives: preventing negative publicity; squelching op-
position and dissent; and destroying competition.
a. Preventing Negative Publicity
One goal of censorship is to prevent the religion from suffering bad
publicity at the hands of its critics.18 Religions depend not only upon the
purported truth of their religious doctrine, but also upon its perceived
reputation or the perceived truth of its doctrine.7 9 Religious organizations
view copyright as a means to squelch negative publicity. That is, the or-
ganizations want to suppress the views of those critical of their religion.
Two cases illustrate this point.80 In New Era Publications Interna-
tional v. Carol Publishing Group, COS filed a copyright infringement
suit against a former member who had recently written a book that the
court characterized as "an unfavorable biography of Hubbard and a
strong attack on Scientology.'' 8' Indeed, "the author's purpose [was] to
expose what he believe[d] [was] the pernicious nature of the Church and
the deceit that is the foundation of its teachings." 82 To accomplish this
task, the defendant used many quotations from L. Ron Hubbard's writ-
ings.83 COS sued to enjoin publication of the book.84
This is not uncommon, at least for the Church of Scientology. Two
years prior, in 1988, the same organization sued a similar defendant, al-
leging copyright infringement. 85 The defendant had published a
biography that criticized and discredited L. Ron Hubbard.86 The district
court noted that a previous suit commenced in England had failed
78. See New Era Publ'ns v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 154 (2nd Cir. 1990);
New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1497 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
See also Urantia Found. v. Burton, 1980 WL 1176, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 1980) (decid-
ing a case where plaintiff, a religious organization, sued a disillusioned former member for
copyright infringement to prevent him from disseminating the work in a manner different than
the organization).
79. See Simon, supra note 41, at 268-84.
80. Compare Carol Publ 'g, 904 F2d at 152, and Henry Holt, 695 F. Supp. at 1493.
81. Carol Publ'g, 904 F.2d at 154.
82. Id. at 153-54.
83. Id. at 154.
84. Id. at 153.
85. Henry Holt, 695 F. Supp. at 1497.
86. Id. at 1508 (quoting the introduction of the defendant's book).
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because the court found that "the litigation was instituted to 'stifle criti-
cism.. ,..
b. Squelching Dissent and Opposition
A second goal of censorship is to squelch dissent and opposition.88
Oftentimes, religious groups splinter from their mother organization.8
When this happens, the new group and the old group disagree about doc-
trinal issues, some of which will be fixed in written form.90 Usually one
group will attempt to prevent the other from publishing or using alterna-
tive or edited versions of these works.9' To do this, religious
organizations invoke copyright law, with which they can prevent unau-
thorized copying, public performance, display, distribution, and
derivative works.92
Again, the case law is illustrative. In Worldwide Church of God v.
Philadelphia Church of God (WCG), the plaintiff was the original reli-
gious group founded by Herbert Armstrong.93 At the ripe old age of
87. Id. at 1497 (quoting Church of Scientology v. Russell Miller, High Ct. of Justice,
Ch. Div., Oct. 9, 1987, at 16).
88. Berg, supra note 21, 287-88 (discussing the WCG case, infra note 90, and stating
that the panel on which his article reports discussed the case and how it showed "copyright
law can be misused to suppress religious disagreement"); Heinss, supra note 22, at 704 (not-
ing that copyright may be "used to suppress a religious minority or religious dissent" and
arguing for a neutral application of copyright law to religious organizations).
89. See Simon, supra note 41, 268-84.
90. Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God (WCG), Inc., 227 F.3d
1 110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000); see Simon, supra note 41, 268-84.
91. Berg, supra note 21, at 315 (describing WCG, supra note 90, and stating that,
"[w]hile the defendant's use might have usurped demand (in the core copyright sense) for the
original work of Mystery of the Ages, the plaintiff was not seeking to capture that demand. It
wanted to suppress demand for that work instead of exploiting it."). This type of use also looks
like the maintenance of doctrinal purity, discussed infra Part I.B.2.
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) ("Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(I) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copy-
righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmis-
sion."); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) ("(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in sec-
tion 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of
section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. For
purposes of this chapter (other than section 506), any reference to copyright shall be deemed
to include the rights conferred by section 106A(a).").
93. WCG, 227 F.3d at 1113.
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ninety two, Armstrong wrote a book that became a literary pillar of the
religion; and the Church adhered to many of its doctrines. 94 After Arm-
strong died, however, a doctrinal schism arose in the Church. The
plaintiff concluded that Armstrong's book espoused "ecclesiastical error"
because it "conveyed outdated views that were racist in nature." ' As a
result of this doctrinal shift, a splinter group (the defendant) arose, "grew
to over six thousand members[, . . . and claim[ed] strictly [sic] to follow
the teachings of ... Armstrong." The defendant then began copying and
distributing Armstrong's book,97 which the plaintiff subsequently sued to
prohibit. 98 One scholar has commented, "While the defendant's use
might have usurped demand (in the core copyright sense) for the original
work of Mystery of the Ages, the plaintiff was not seeking to capture
that demand. It wanted to suppress demand for that work instead of ex-
ploiting it."
c. Destroying Competition
Another motivation behind censorship is to destroy competition.'°°
To understand this goal, one needs to view the religious world as a mar-
ketplace.'"' In this marketplace, religions compete for potential
members.' 2 To do this, an organization might argue about the validity of
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1 114.
99. Berg, supra note 2 1, at 315.
100. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986). This
goal is probably less prominent in copyright law than in trademark law, which deals with
competition more explicitly.
101. See R. LAURENCE MOORE, SELLING GOD: AMERICAN RELIGION IN THE MARKET-
PLACE OF CULTURE 4-7 (1994) (noting that as religions lost control of their members, they
entered the cultural fray, engaging in efforts to maintain membership by commodifying their
religions); id. at 7 (arguing that the First Amendment contributed to the commodification of
religion); WADE CLARK ROOF, SPIRITUAL MARKETPLACE: BABY BOOMERS AND THE REMAK-
ING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 78 (2001) ("Religion in any age exists in a dynamic and
interactive relationship with its cultural environment; and, in our time we witness an expan-
sion and elaboration of spiritual themes that counts to a major restructuring of religious
market dynamics."); id. at 80 (noting that "[n]ew religious movements [carve out niches for
themselves, creating a constituency] when they reach out to people who feel alienated from
the established faiths and offer them a more satisfactory alternative"); id. ("If we think of this
larger spiritual marketplace as a 'social field' where all the agents, conventionally religious or
not, try to generate and/or preserve religious capital, i.e., legitimacy, acceptance, and influ-
ence, then we can begin to grasp the breadth and depth of a huge, highly competitive spiritual
marketplace."). Many theists or religious people may reject this conception of religion; how-
ever, many religions inherently recognize the marketplace of religion despite the fact they
couch their recognition in religious terms.
102. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., No. 95-20091, 1997
WL 34605244, *9-12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1997). In Netcom, the court noted, when deciding
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its views, framing the debate in terms of theological contentions. But
argument alone is not as powerful as argument without rebuttal, and less
powerful still than the only argument in existence. In other words, by
censoring competition, religious organizations seek to prevent, not only
counterarguments (i.e., squelching criticism), but also any argument at
all. If no rivals exist, the original organization's religious argument be-
comes stronger. Like a product manufactured and sold by only one
company, an organization that espouses a religion without any alterna-
tives with which to compete is more likely to succeed-that is, to retain
and attract members, and to prevent new religious groups from arising.
Courts explicitly touch on this issue when discussing fair use, which
they assess using the four factors stated in the Copyright Act.' °3 The
fourth fair-use factor considers "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work."' '° In WCG, the court stated
that the analysis of this factor should not change for religious organiza-
tions: "Religious institutions ... would suffer if their publications
invested with an institution's reputation and goodwill could be freely
appropriated by anyone"' 0' The court noted that the people responding to
the defendant's ads for the infringing work likely were people "who
would be interested in WCG's planned annotated version or any future
republication of the original version."' ° In fact, the court said, WCG's
new book was an attempt "to reach out to those familiar with Arm-
strong's teachings and those in the broader Christian community."'' 7 But
that attempt could be impeded or fail because "[the defendant's] distribu-
tion of its unauthorized version of [the work] ... harm[ed] WCG's
goodwill by diverting potential members and distributions from
WCG.' ' 8 Interestingly, though, the court explicitly noted that WCG's
purpose in suing was the same reason it had not published the work: it
sought to promote the "correct" church doctrine.'9
whether to grant a preliminary injunction, that the "defendant ha[d] not established the extent
to which the specific processes and instructions contained in the works are known generally or
to potential competitors." Id. at 12. It went on to comment that it was uncertain "[how to
identify 'potential competitors.'" Id. at 12 n.17. This shows that when deciding a trade secret
claim, the court must view, and presumably the religious organization does view, religions as
competitors for members or, at the very least, adherents.
103. For a description of the fair use factors, see infra Part III.D.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
105. Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God (WGC), Inc., 227 F.3d
1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). The court here seems to focus on goodwill, which is a concept
prominent in trademark law, not copyright law.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. ("WCG explained that it ceased distribution because the Church's position on
various doctrines had changed, continued distribution would offend cultural standards of so-
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In Bridge Publications v. Vien, COS brought a claim for copyright
infringement against a former member of COS who had abandoned the
Church and set up her own competing church."0 The defendant also cop-
ied and used Scientology works in her religion course, which she sold to
students.'" The court noted, when discussing the fourth fair use factor
(market effect), that, "since [the] defendant use[d] the works for the
same purpose intended by plaintiffs, it appearled] [the] defendant's un-
authorized copies fulfill[ed] 'the demand for the original' works and
'diminish[ed] or prejudice[d]' their potential sale.""' 2
Another example of this censorship occurred in Religious Technol-
ogy Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication, where COS filed a
copyright infringement suit against a former member who had posted L.
Ron Hubbard's writings on the Internet."3 The former member "ha[d]
been a vocal critic of Scientology and ... consider[ed] it part of his call-
ing to foster critical debate about Scientology through humorous and
critical writings."' 14 COS tried to ride on the Vien court's coattails, argu-
ing "that [the former member's] posting of plaintiffs' copyrighted works
over the Internet, where more than 25 million subscribers could access
them, could potentially have a detrimental [market] effect on plain-
tiffs.""' The court rejected this argument, holding that the defendant's
works were not meant compete with COS, and, even if they were, COS
failed to show that the defendant's works would compete with COS."'
Wollersheim, in its discussion of trade secrets," 7 demonstrates how
otherwise "religious" objectives are, in reality, competitive objectives. In
Wollersheim, COS brought a claim for trade secret misappropriation
against a former member." 8 Part of a trade secret claim (in this case un-
der California law) requires that the information stolen has "independent
cial sensitivity, and dissemination would perpetuate what the Church considered ecclesiastical
error.").
110. Bridge Publications v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 632 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
Ill. Id. at 632 ("The undisputed evidence shows that defendant copied or directed her
students to copy plaintiffs' copyrighted materials as part of a 'Dynamism' course which she
offered for sale.").
112. Id. at 636.
113. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1239
(N.D. Cal 1995).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1248 (discussing fair use).
116. Id.
117. Although the court discusses trade secrets, it makes the point that religions do com-
pete in a marketplace, and that fact does not change simply because the plaintiff's theory of
liability does.
118. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. Cal.
1986).
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economic value." 9 While the court held that the Church failed to claim
the materials had economic value, it also held that trade secrets claims
"can[not] be based on the spiritual advantage the Church believes its
adherents acquire over non-adherents by using the materials in the pre-
scribed manner."'2 This case illustrates that the Church's motivations
included the desire to prevent other groups from competing with it.
This anti-competitive spirit provides at least one motivation for reli-
gious organizations to invoke copyright law.' Religious organizations,
though, often see competing religions as improperly stating versions of
their own religious doctrines, or as improperly stealing or appropriating
"their" religious ideas.'22 To combat this problem, they invoke copyright
law.
2. Doctrinal Purity
In addition to censorship, a desire to control religious doctrine may
motivate religious organizations to seek copyright protection."' The abil-
119. Id. at 1090. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985) (defining a trade se-
cret to include information that "derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use").
120. Id.
121. See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1992); Berg, supra note 2 1, at
315 ("[T]he nature of the competition between the two [religious] parties is still ideological.").
In Arica, the defendant had published a book that described the principal devices used in the
plaintiff's religion (enneagrams). 970 F.2d at 1071. The defendant's book described the en-
neagram and its history. Id. It also displayed several enneagrams that were "virtually identical
to [the] [plaintiff's] counterparts." Id. The plaintiff sued because it felt the defendant's book
would allow others to have access to its religion, or at least a variation of its religion. Indeed,
the court commented, when assessing the fourth fair use factor (market effect), that "[bloth
[plaintiff's and defendant's] works might well interest those pursuing emotional and psycho-
logical self-help." Id. at 1078.
122. See Phillips v. Beck, No. 06-628, 2007 WL 2972605, at *1 (D. Hawai'i Oct. 9,
2007). See also Phillips v. Murdock, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1221-22 (D. Hawai'i 2008) (de-
ciding a case where plaintiff sued defendant for copyright and trademark infringement based
on defendant's advertisement for his book, which plaintiff felt "ha[d] a 'similar' title to [her]
work"). In Beck, the plaintiff alleged that "she founded the Stoic Church of Philosophy" and
wrote a book for the Stoic Church. 2007 WL 2972605, at *3. Later, the defendant published a
book, which described the same philosophy and bore the same short title as the plaintiff's
book. Id. The plaintiff also brought a trademark claim and called the defendant's book "plagia-
rism." Id. at *3, *9. While not expressly declared, one can infer that the plaintiff sought to
prevent the defendant from "stealing" her ideas or religious doctrine, or otherwise competing
with her book.
123. See Bridge Publications, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629,633 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Beryl
R. Jones, Copyright and Suppression of Religious Dissent, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 107, 107 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1999). In Vien, COS sued the defendant,
alleging that the Scientology texts the defendant had appropriated constituted trade secrets.
827 F. Supp. at 632-33. The Court stated that the plaintiff's "[religious text] is confidential
and kept under tight security, is disclosed only to those who have attained the requisite level of
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ity to control the text of a religion is extremely important, at least to reli-
gious organizations. 4 A related goal is to preserve doctrinal purity.'2
Religions may conceive of their texts, like Islam does of the Qur'an, as
pure and precise, and properly distributed only as a facsimile.'26 Unre-
stricted copying and distribution of a text places it at risk of change or
interpretation.1
27
When unlimited distributions and copies are permitted, abridge-
ments, distortions, and rearrangements of the original work may
appear.'1 8 Religious works change depending on ordering or sequencing,
and new editions or poetic compilations may change the ordering or the
context in which the language appears. '29 As a result, these derivative
works can change the meaning of the doctrine or message in the original
work. To prevent these changes, religious groups will invoke copyright
law, suing to prevent unauthorized copying and distribution of the (de-
rivative) religious works.'30
Those were precisely the concerns of the plaintiff in NCCFE.3 ' In
that case, Schucman, an associate professor of medical psychology at
Columbia University, had written a religious work called A Course in
Miracles (the Course), claiming to be merely the "scribe" through which
Jesus spoke.' 2 After writing the Course, though, the author claimed to
have been pressed by Jesus to obtain a copyright: "At some point during
the summer of 1975, after it became apparent that an interest for the
Course was developing, Schucman heard from ... [Jesus] that copyright
registration should be sought for the Course, ostensibly in order to pre-
serve the form of the Course against the possibility of incomplete or
spiritual training, and cannot be accessed without first signing an agreement to maintain its
secrecy and confidentiality." Id. at 633.
124. WILLIAM A. GRAHAM, BEYOND THE WRITTEN WORD: ORAL ASPECTS OF SCRIPTURE
IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION 79-80 (1993) (noting that the Qur'an's text is so important
because the book is read aloud to communicate its message).
125. United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., First Church of Christ,
Scientist (UCS), 829 F.2d 1152, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Doubtlessly, censorship and doctrinal
purity motivations may overlap, but they are distinct. Squelching dissent or opposition is fun-
damentally different from preserving purity, even if both motivations may have similar results
or similar means of achieving those results.
126. E.g., Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor
(NCCFE), No. 96-4126, 2000 WL 1028634, at *1-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000), vacated, No.
96-4126, 2004 WL 906301 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 27, 2004).
127. E.g., id.
128. See id. (entering judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing the case). See
also Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1291
(D. Utah 1999) (granting a preliminary injunction after the defendant posted the plaintiff's
Church Handbook of Instructions on its website without permission).
129. NCCFE, 2000 WL 1028634, at *6.
130. See id. at *7-8.
131. Id. at *6.
132. Id. at *2.
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corrupted editions."'33 While the organization holding the copyright to
this work at first took "a very liberal stance regarding permission to
quote from the Course" that stance changed as interest in the work in-
1.34
creased.' The group stepped up enforcement because the "lax policy"
gave rise to "a number of abridgements and poetic compilations of pas-
sages" that "directly contravened Jesus' very specific instructions ...
that the three books should never be separated ... nor should any of the
material appear out of context in abridged form.""'3 Furthermore, transla-
tions emerged, which Schucman asserted were, "at the very least,
inaccurate, leading to unacceptable distortions of the Course's central
teachings.'
36
Religious organizations have done more than just initiate copyright
infringement actions to preserve doctrinal purity. One religious group
successfully lobbied the United States Congress to pass a private law
that extended the copyright term of the group's religious works. '37 At
issue in United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Board of Direc-
tors, First Church of Christ, Scientist, was a private law passed by
Congress that granted and extended the copyright term of the works held
by the First Church of Christ (the First Church).'38 A splinter group, the
United Christian Scientists (UCS), disagreed with the First Church on
matters of membership and doctrine.'39 This dispute concerned the accu-
racy or propriety of the doctrine contained in a later edition in one of the
First Church's works.'4 ° The conflict emanated from UCS's distribution
of work without permission. 4 In response to the First Church's accusa-
tions that UCS infringed its works, UCS brought an action seeking a
declaratory judgment that the private law was unconstitutional.' 2
The impetus for the law was a desire to protect the religion's doc-
trinal purity.'4 3 The First Church explained its concern for doctrinal
purity this way:
133. Id. at *4.
134. Id. at *6.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., First Church of Christ,
Scientist (UCS), 829 F.2d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1155.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1157-58.
143. Id. at 1163 ("Church witnesses testifying on behalf of the legislation explained
pointedly that their purpose in seeking copyright protection for [the work] was to maintain its
doctrinal purity.").
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Changes of wording ... are extremely important to members of
our church. To others they may seem minor, but, as those of you
know who are familiar with matters religious, centuries in the
Christian church were devoted to clarifying just such questions
of wording. Words, of course, stand for religious positions of
vast significance in the lives of thousands of believers.'"
In effect, the members the First Church saw themselves as stewards
or "guardians of doctrinal purity.' 41 UCS shows what was at stake for the
First Church, and what is at stake for most religious organizations:
"powers greater than commercial interest[s].' ' ' Their mission is to "pro-
tect religion ... [and] to protect what God wants his children to hear."
'
'
4 7
Indeed, the purpose of the legislation at issue in UCS, as echoed, amaz-
ingly, by Senate and House Committee members,
was not to provide pecuniary profit or material gain for the Trus-
tees or the Church, but to preserve and maintain the purity and
integrity of the statement of the religious teachings of this de-
nomination, . . . to protect [against] ... distorted version[s] of
the teachings of Christian Science[,] [and to] ... preserve the
true and correct version. 
48
Beyond UCS, cases like WCG also demonstrate the desire of reli-
gious organizations to protect doctrinal purity using copyright law. In
WCG, as discussed supra, one of the reasons the WCG brought an in-
fringement action was to prevent "dissemination [that] would perpetuate
what the Church considered ecclesiastical error."'
4 9
These two religious motivations-to censor others' use of the or-
ganization's works or to preserve doctrinal purity-represent the primary
reasons that religious organizations seek copyright protection. The criti-
cal role that written works play in religion explains whey religious
organizations value their texts. It also explains why they attempt to pro-
tect those works. In their efforts, however, these groups employ a secular
disciple: copyright law. Without much inspection, this arrangement may
seem benign, or even beneficial. After all, religious organizations are
144. Id. at 1163 (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 1164 (explaining that this is what the witnesses testified they felt their role
was in the Church and in seeking the passage of the private law).
146. Id. at 1163 (quoting witness testimony before Congress articulating the reasons for
passing the private law extending the copyright term in the religious works).
147. Id. (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 1165 (quoting S. REP. No. 280, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971); H.R. REP. No.
604, 92d Cong., I st Sess. 3 (1971 )).
149. Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God (WCG), Inc., 227 F.3d
I 110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000).
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allowed to use the courts just as nonreligious organizations and authors.
Closer inspection performed in the next Part explains why these uses of
copyright law are, not only harmful, but fundamentally conflict with the
underlying principles of copyright law.
II. THREE THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT AND RELIGIOUS
MOTIVATIONS FOR PROTECTION
The previous Part provided the necessary introduction to religious
uses of copyright. It left unaddressed, however, the normative questions
about these religious uses. This Part lays the foundation needed to ad-
dress those questions, exploring the underlying principles of copyright
law and analyzing whether they conflict or comport with religious uses.
Because understanding whether religious uses of copyright law align or
conflict with copyright law generally depends upon the underlying prin-
ciples of copyright law, this Article reviews and explains three theories
of copyright law: economic theory, property rights theory, and cultural
theory. Each of these theories espouses at least one justification for
copyright. This Part explicates each theory individually and, in the proc-
ess, evaluates whether the religious reasons for using copyright align or
conflict with them.
The first two theories-economic theory and property rights the-
ory-are the most traditional."O The last theory examined, known as
cultural theory, is somewhat marginalized and has been given attention
only recently."' While this Article explores all of these theories, it will
focus mainly on the property rights theory because religious organiza-
tions, like ordinary people, think mainly in terms of property and natural
rights.12 Furthermore, it gives the reader a chance to see how copyrights
may not have as strong a relationship to natural law as initially thought.
150. Julie Cohen, Creativit and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVis L. REV.
1151, 1155-56 (2007).
151. Id. at 1152-53, 1155-56 (describing how rights and economic theorists overlook
other methodological approaches to copyright, including the approach Cohen defines).
152. See Roger Syn, © Copyright God: Enforcement of Copyright in the Bible and Reli-
gious Works, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. I, 23 (2002). Syn notes that the Bible may dictate who
owns copyright in natural law terms:
There is a further overriding doctrine, however. The foundation church doctrine is
that Jesus Christ is Lord, with Christians at least as servants. Employers own the
copyright in employees' works. Hence, if an author confesses to being God's ser-
vant, and that Jesus is his Lord, Master, and King, under copyright law that infers
God has first claim to his copyright. Moreover, if Jesus is king, then Crown rights
and eminent domain apply. Aside from this copyright reasoning, the doctrine of
Christ's Lordship claims every aspect of an author's creativity: the ideas, expression,
and translation of those ideas; the copyright; and everything else.
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A. Economic Theory
The basic economic theory of copyright is driven by incentives: by
protecting the expression of ideas (and not ideas themselves), copyright
incentivizes the creation of new works and reduces the negative external-
ities of free riders. To promote economic efficiency, most economists
agree that two propositions are required: (1) copyright ownership of (2)
limited duration.' In other words, the system of copyright promotes
economic efficiency by encouraging innovation using a monopoly over
the artists' work and by limiting the term of copyright to lessen the cost
of producing works.'4
Copyright law corrects for inefficiencies that would exist absent the
protection it provides. In the absence of copyright, publishers would
have a disincentive to announce publication dates or promote works, and
copiers would have incentives to begin copying as quickly as possible.'"5
The incentive to create "faddish" works also would increase because
they generate revenue quickly while being least susceptible to (loss of
revenue because of) copying.'""
While economists note the paucity of data available to determine ex-
actly how long a copyright should be to create the proper economic
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). Syn goes on to observe that courts do not accept such a theory as
the basis for copyright ownership. Id. As a result, religious groups may face a difficult choice:
If God is as the Bible reveals Him to be, then copyright principles point to God
owning the copyright. But courts ignore such theological reasoning and accept hu-
mans as the copyright owners. Therefore, there may be a dilemma in adopting
business practices which reflect the courts' secular assumptions about God and the
Bible.
Id. at 25.
153. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright 4 (John
M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 154, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=319321 ("Two propositions are widely
believed by most economists .... The first proposition is that so far as is feasible, all valuable
resources, including copyrightable works, should be owned, in order to create incentives for
their efficient exploitation and to avoid overuse. The second proposition is that copyright
should be limited in duration.").
154. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) ("Copyright protection-the right of the copyright's owner
to prevent others from making copies-trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against
the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place."). For a broader and more
complete economic analysis of copyright law, see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW passim (2003).
155. Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright I.,aw, supra note 154, at 332.
156. Id.; LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW, supra note 154, at 57.
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incentives for creation,' 7 this remains "the central problem" for eco-
nomic scholars of copyright law.' 8 The debate, therefore, is not really
over whether copyright should exist, but for how long copyright should
protect a work. Richard Posner and William Landes note that, beyond
some point, copyright protection becomes counter-productive because
production costs become too high.' "9 As the cultural theorists so vehe-
mently emphasize, '6° authors necessarily borrow others' ideas and
expressions when creating a work.' 6' Less copyright protection gives the
creator greater "borrowing ability," freeing the author to take more at
less cost.' 2 Conversely, more monopolistic protection creates higher
creation costs-because the author can borrow less freely-which, in
turn, reduces the total number of works produced.63
Religious organizations that pursue copyright, at least in part, for
economic reasons have almost no trouble with these economic goals of
copyright. In many ways, the economic incentives that copyright law
provides benefit creators of religious works. Some authors and organiza-
tions may seek to recoup the costs of penning religious texts, and the
economic theory of copyright provides them a way of doing so.
157. See Stan Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in
on Copyright: The Role of Theor, Empirics, and Network Effects 10, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=488085.
158. See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 154, at
326 ("Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in
copyright law."). See also Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 157, at 1-20; Brief of George A.
Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(No. 01-618) (discussing why the Copyright Term Extension Act, which (retroactively) ex-
tended U.S. Copyright terms by twenty years, should be declared unconstitutional).
159. Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 154, at 332.
160. See infra Part II.A.3.
161. LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW, supra note 154, at 58-60 (explaining how Shakespeare, T.S. Eliot, Kafka, and others
borrowed heavily-and sometimes outright copied-(portions of) others' works). As a legal
historian friend of mine commented when starting her Ph.D., "I have begun to realize that
scholarship is just a nuanced way of presenting many different ideas that have been written
about already."
162 See id. at 52 (explaining that the "absence of copyright protection ... reduces the
cost of [creating] by enabling the author to freely copy from his predecessors").
163. Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 154, at 332
("The effect [of overly-monopolistic protection] would be to raise the cost of creating new
works-the cost of expression, broadly defined-and thus, paradoxically, perhaps lower the
number of works created."); LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 154, at 67-70. Some may see the effect of a monopoly as
indeterminate-that is, it may actually spur incentive to create, thereby creating more works,
or it may have the opposite effect. That indeterminacy vanishes, however, at some point-the
point at which the incentive power of a monopoly fades because of the sheer length of the
monopoly. I wish to make only the point that increasingly monopolistic protection may not
lead to an increased incentive to create. Thanks to Thomas Cotter for raising this objection.
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Nevertheless, conflicts exist when comparing economic theory to
doctrinal purity and censorship motivations. First, the issue of duration is
often a sticking point for religions. Article I, section 8, of the United
States Constitution states that Congress has the power "[t]o promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to au-
thors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.""M Although Congress has continually expanded the "term"
of the copyright, which currently stands at the life of the author plus sev-
enty years, 65 the term must be for a fixed period of time.
Since many religious organizations seek doctrinal purity or immuni-
zation from criticism, a copyright term is insufficient. While they like the
idea of incentives that do not create faddish works, their primary concern
is everlasting doctrinal purity and censorship.'6 While copyright scholars
debate the length a copyright should last, for religious groups there is no
debate: protection of religious works should last forever.6 7 In that sense,
the economic justification of copyright directly conflicts with religious
motivations.
Furthermore, copyright law's economic incentive to create may have
little to no effect' 68 on creators of religious works since the authors may
164. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
166. E.g., Ali Kahn, Islam as Intellectual Property: "My Lord! Increase Me in Knowl-
edge", 31 CUMB. L. REV. 631, 635-36 (2001) ("Another important attribute distinguishes
intellectual property from the protected knowledge of Islam. Intellectual property is often
commercial in nature, protected only for a short duration. Furthermore, the knowledge under-
lying intellectual property may be faulty, frivolous, or even harmful. Unlike intellectual
property, the protected knowledge of Islam is not for sale or commercial exploitation. Islamic
knowledge is based on assured certainty, which the Quran describes as eln-al-yaqqin. As
such, the protected knowledge of Islam is timeless and imperishable. It is handed down from
one generation of Muslims to the next without innovations, alterations, or diminishment in
value.") (citation omitted).
167. See, e.g., United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., First Church of
Christ, Scientist (UCS), 829 F.2d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
168. Much debate currently surrounds whether copyright law should account for
noneconomic creation incentives. Some have argued that copyright law should take into ac-
count the author's creation incentives. See infra note 169. While that issue is outside the scope
of this Article, some courts have misconstrued the certain rights granted to copyright owners
as accommodating (endorsing?) this view. E.g., Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). In Colting, the coon stated:
[S]ome artists may be further incentivized to create original works due to the avail-
ability of the right not to produce any sequels. This might be the case if, for
instance, an author's artistic vision includes leaving certain portions or aspects of
his character's story to the varied imaginations of his readers, or if he hopes that his
readers will engage in discussion and speculation as to what happened subse-
quently. Just as licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the
creation of originals, so too will the right not to license derivatives sometimes act as
an incentive to the creation of originals.
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create out of a moral obligation or spiritual motivation, not a financial
one.69 But even religious organizations need money to remain in busi-
ness, and another author has termed use of copyright to generate
Id. at 268 (first emphasis added). In a somewhat similar vein, the Supreme Court has
suggested that the copyright owner may have a First Amendment interest in not speaking. See
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
169. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension
of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1951-62 (2006) (detailing the narrative
accounts of religious and spiritual innovation and creation incentives); Lydia Pallas Loren, The
Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives With Realities by Using Creative Motivation To Shape
Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. I, 8 (2008) (noting that organizations like the Vatican
"ha[ve] sufficient incentive to both create and distribute papal texts without regard for the
rights afforded by copyright protection ... [because] [tlhe Vatican seeks to provide guidance
to those of the Catholic faith on a wide array of matters"); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of
Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 526 (2009)
(endorsing Kwall's account of creation narratives, though qualifying this endorsement by
stating that "[wihereas Kwall emphasizes ... the author [a]s an instrument of God ... I will
speak more of compulsion and nonrational calculation").
Many individuals write for reasons other than money. Paul Auster, a renowned novelist,
has articulated an almost religious sentiment about writing (at least for literary authors): "1
don't think about my reputation, I don't think about my so-called 'career.' What I do is push on
every day, doing the best I can to write the things I feel I have to write." Interview, Paul Aus-
ter, http://www.failbetter.com/O8/Austerlnterview.php (last visited April 13, 2009). A growing
body of literature has begun to acknowledge that other factors besides copyright incentivize
and motivate people to create and use, or abstain from using, others' works. See generallv
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (explaining and expanding on his conception of collaborative,
commons-based peer production); Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature
of the Firm, 112 YALE L. J. 369 (2002) (describing the emergence of collaborative, "com-
mons-based peer production," which is separate from the traditional explanations of markets
of managerial hierarchies, and explaining why these collaborative efforts arise and how they
are sustained); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should
Thonas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121
(2007) (arguing that creators of original dishes, doctrinally speaking, could be given copyright
protection but that such protection would be inappropriate at least in part because chefs have a
"culture of hospitality"); Emmanulle Fauchart & Eric Von Hippel, Norns-Based Intellectual
Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs (Mass. Inst. Of Tech. Sloan Sch. Of Mgmt., MIT
Sloan, Working Paper No. 4576-06, 2006) (describing the norms-based structure that regulates
the use and nonuse of recipes among French chefs); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman,
There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008) (explaining the norms gov-
eming stand-up comedians and the re-use of jokes).
In a future work, I will argue that creation memes-over which the "creator" has limited
control-are a mechanism for cultural production. David A. Simon, A Menetic Account of
Creativity, (forthcoming 2011) (abstract available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1516380). For a
brief introduction to how memetics might work, see, for example, SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE
MEME MACHINE 38-42 (1999) (describing how successful memes are those that require our
brains to rehearse them). The memetic account of creation should not be confused with Pro-
fessor Roberta Kwall's account. Where Kwall focuses on the artist as a singular creator
inspired by the divine, memetics conceptualizes creation as a less-original process influenced,
in large part, by replicators.
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sufficient income (but not profit) a "sustenance right.""'7 This sustenance
right aligns to a greater degree with the economic theory of copyright
than the moral motivation. But, to the extent that religious works are the
product of nonmonetary motivations, they do not accord with this justifi-
cation of copyright law."'
B. Property Rights Theory
Copyright is often conceptualized as a form of property. The term
"intellectual property" leads some people to regard copyrights as fruit of
the Lockean labor theory. 72 Indeed, some scholars, such as Richard Ep-
stein, have advocated for a Lockean-based theory of intellectual
property.' 7 Other scholars, however, have rejected such a theory as out-
right wrong, noting that history illustrates that copyrights are
fundamentally not property, and that copyrights have been hijacked by
classifying them as "intellectual property."
'
1
74
These two competing views represent a split among scholars as to
whether intellectual property should be viewed (more) like tangible
property. They also illustrate two underlying principles of copyright to-
day. The first view, what we may call the Lockean View or Natural Law
View, argues that because copyrights are the product of personal labor,
they should be treated the same as any other property. The second view,
which we may call the Historical View or Positive Law View, disagrees,
170. Syn, supra note 152, at 26-27 (noting that economic rights need not mean that
religions fail to generate income from their works, stating that "[alnother misconception is
that non-enforcement of economic rights means giving [the work] away free," and concluding
that "[m]any in the church advocate copyright as a sustenance right, while de-emphasizing
that copyright only sustains because it is also a legal enforcement right") (citations omitted).
See also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1410 (6th Cir. 1996)
(Ryan, J., dissenting) (noting, while discussing fair use and analyzing licensing fees as an
incentive, that "[mWore than one hundred authors declared on the record that they write for
professional and personal reasons such as making a contribution to a particular discipline,
providing an opportunity for colleagues to evaluate and critique the authors' ideas and theo-
ries, enhancing the authors' professional reputations, and improving career opportunities").
171. Cotter, Gutenberg's Legacy, supra note 20, at 338 n.56 (arguing against differential
treatment of religious works based on the fact that "the copyright incentive [may] be unneces-
sary for the creation and dissemination of at least some religious works").
172. See Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement Embrace of Intellectual Prop-
erty: True Love or Doomed Relationship, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 720 (2007). Menell notes
that, even though the term "intellectual property" is relatively new, the courts have treated
copyright as a form of property throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centu-
ries. Id. at 720-21.
173. Richard Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright
Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. I (2005).
174. E.g., see Liam Sdamus O'Melinn, Software and Shovels: How the Intellectual
Property Revolution is Undermining Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV.
143, 145-61 (2007); see also infra Part I.A.2.ii.
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contending that copyright is a creature of statutory grant that has never
been, and should never be, treated exactly like real or personal property.
This subpart explores each of these views. It first considers the
Lockean View, tracing the arguments scholars have made in its support,
and noting relevant court decisions where necessary. Next, this subpart
examines the Historical View, explaining the linear approach that many
scholars have taken to copyright law and also noting legislation and rele-
vant court decisions where necessary. Again, after each view is
explained, the Article analyzes whether the religious uses of copyright
align or conflict with them.
1. Lockean View (Natural Law)
a. Lockean Theory and Its Provisos
Understanding why some scholars treat copyrights as property re-
quires an understanding of the Natural Law View of property that
remains part of American law today. The father of this view was the
English political philosopher John Locke.
Locke's theory of property is based on natural law. Locke believed
that states of nature set conditions that gave rise to laws, collectively re-
ferred to as natural law.'7  One such aspect of his natural law philosophy
was his theory of property, which had several conceptual steps. This the-
ory first posited that there existed in nature, as bestowed upon the world
by God, a "commons" to which no one person held ownership. '76 Lakes,
streams, animals, and all other fruits produced by the "spontaneous hand
of nature" fell into this category."'
In addition to the idea of a "commons," Locke viewed "every man
[as] halving] property in his own person."'78 This right is held by each
175. At least one author interprets the transition from the state of nature to civil society
as destroying the property rights acquired in the state of nature. Barbara Friedman, Note, The
Herbert Tenzer Memorial Conference: Copyright in the Twenty-First Century: From Deontol-
ogy to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
157, 163 (1994) ("The transition from the state of nature to civil society may be seen as mark-
ing the end of deontological private property in Locke's theory and its replacement by
consequentialism."). A society must have rules, and those rules will decide individuals'
fights-the state of nature is not an imperative.
176. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 25 (Hackett Publishing Co.
1980) (stating that "it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal cxv. 16. has given the
earth to the children of inen; given it to mankind in common"). See Ian Shapiro, John Locke's
Democratic Theory, in JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CON-
CERNING TOLERATION 312 (lan Shapiro, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) ("Locke's frequent
appeals to metaphors of workmanship and watch making in the Two Treatises and elsewhere
make it fundamental that men are obliged to God because of his purpose in making them.").
177. LOCKE, supra note 176, at § 26.
178. Id. at § 27.
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individual, and no other individual has a right to another's person. 79 It
stands to reason, then, according to Locke, that the results of one's labor
are hers. And, concluding the thought, Locke asserted that when an indi-
vidual "mixes his labour with" something in the commons, it becomes
her property. 80
To summarize, Locke claimed that the fruits of an individual's labor
can rightly be called her own property based on three conceptual steps.
First, all natural objects existed in "the commons," which has no current
owner and which every individual is free to appropriate. Second, an in-
dividual has property in her own body. Thus, when an individual mixes
labor (i.e., her body) with the commons, the resulting product becomes
her property.
Locke's theory, however, has its caveats--or "provisos" as they are
known in philosophy.' 8' The first proviso states that an individual appro-
priating property must leave enough in the commons so that others may
obtain their own property.8 2 So, where there exists a forest of boars that
sustain the human population, a man who can eat only one boar may not
kill all the boars in the forest, keeping them to rot. To do so would vio-
late this first proviso by not leaving enough boars for others to eat.
Because copyrighted expressions are nonrivalrous' 83-i.e., since use of
copyrighted expression by one person does not inhibit simultaneous use
of the same copyrighted expression by another-there will always be
"enough and as good" for others.'4
179. Id.
180. Id. Others, such as Wendy Gordon, have explained Locke's conception of property,
after the expended labor, in terms of desert. Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Low of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE
L.J. 1533, 1561 (1993). She states that "the laborer's claim to deserve property is itself justi-
fied ... [by] two primary elements: an assumption that to take the product of the laborer's
effort is to cause harm to the laborer, and the law of nature that all persons have a duty to
refrain from causing harm." Id. (citations omitted). In other words, all claims to property are
based on Lockean harm principles.
181. Wendy Gordon explains these two provisos as only one proviso. Id. at 1562-65.
182. Locke, supra note 176, at § 27 ("[F]or this labour being the unquestionable prop-
erty of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least
where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others."). This is called the "enough
and as good" proviso.
183. See infra Part lI.A.2.i.b.
184. This seems to imply that copyright should not be treated as Lockean property be-
cause there will be "enough, and as good" only if the copyright owner is unable control
subsequent copies. There are three reasons why this is not so. First, use does not imply in-
fringement. In other words, numerous individuals can use a copyrighted work for a variety of
purposes without copying or otherwise infringing. Second, the law permits copying of the
unprotected materials in the public domain from which the work was created. Third, the ideas
in the copyright are not protected. This is significant if the primary concern with respect to
copyrights is the ability to appropriate ideas. In Lockean terms, there always will be "enough,
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Locke's second proviso is a response to the objection that people
hoard resources if they own what they gather.' 5 Locke begins by elo-
quently responding to this objection: "Not so. The same law of nature,
that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property
too"' 86 The second proviso requires that no individual take more out of
the commons than he can rightly use.' 87 For example, one who can till
only 10 acres of land may not possess 50 acres for himself. The nonrival-
rous nature of copyrighted materials also seems to easily satisfy Locke's
no-spoilage proviso:'8 an individual cannot take more of a copyrighted
work than he can rightly use because anyone can appropriate the work. ,89
and as good" ideas left over in spite of the copyright-ideas are not protected by copyright
law. I am indebted to Rebecca Tushnet for raising this objection.
185. Locke, supra note 176, at § 31 ("It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering
the acorns, or other fruits of the earth, etc. makes a right to them, then any one may engross as
much as he will."). This is known as the "no-spoilage proviso."
186. Id.
187. Id. ("As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils,
so much he may by his labour fix a property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his
share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.").
188. Some scholars point out that Locke did not apply his natural law theory of property
directly to intellectual property. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Menes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L.
REv. 331, 402 (2005) (stating that "[aill of John Locke's examples of the just acquisition of
property are based upon the laborer investing effort to creating tangible, rivalrous property,
such as food" and arguing that, from a memetic perspective, it is not clear why simultaneous
use of memes should cause any harm). But, Richard Epstein has rejoined that "it hardly fol-
lows that his theory has no implications for the area." Epstein, supra note 173, at 21. Indeed,
Epstein argues, the labor theory of intellectual property is stronger because there is nothing
physically appropriated from the commons. He meets the arguments of those-like Carys J.
Craig, Locke, Labour and Limiting the Authors' Right: A Warning Against a Lockean Ap-
proach to Copyright law, 28 QUEENs L. J. 1, 31-32 (2002)-who contend that authors do not
wholly own copyrights in the same manner as tangible property, by claiming that those who
contribute to an author's work "get implicit in-kind compensation for their contributions, in
their ability to use the creator's works for their own creations." Epstein, supra note 173, at 22-
23. Thus, Epstein claims, as long as the economic incentives for copyright encourage the crea-
tion of new works, there is no problem.
189. Scholars have disputed that point, noting that "it would be reductionist to assume
that the acquisition of objects of intellectual property cannot violate the no-spoilage proviso
simply because of their abstract nature'" Craig, supra note 188, at 31. While Justin Hughes
notes such depreciation in copyrights, he dismisses this loss as "social," noting the inherent
value of the idea itself never changes. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property,
77 GEo. L.J. 287, 328 (1988) ("While the social value of an idea may decline below an opti-
mal point, the value of the idea, apart from its value to society, may remain constant."). But,
again, Craig has a retort: this description of "value" does not eschew the problems of deprecia-
tion or spoilage. Craig, supra note 188, at 31-32. She notes that that the "true value" of an
idea depends upon its social value, and that even Locke was concerned with social value when
he described property. Id. In other words, saying that the no-spoilage proviso does not apply
because a work loses only social value is like saying a boat loses its value only when it's not
in water the contextual value of a something is what makes it valuable to begin with-nothing
has value in a vacuum.
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Regardless of what arguments scholars make, traces of the natural
law theory taint copyright law today.'" The Lockean View is perhaps the
most consonant with religious reasons for seeking copyright protection,
though it does not comport with it entirely. The core of the Lockean the-
ory is that people should own what they create. In some sense, this also
means that the owner of the copyright should have some control over
how the copyrighted material is used (or not used). That idea is embod-
ied in two primary motivations of religious organizations; at the heart of
doctrinal purity and censorship is the maintenance of control over the
religious texts.
But some aspects of the Lockean View do not accord completely
with religious motivations for copyright protection. Religious works are
often seen as the handiwork of God, not individuals.' 9' Although Locke
thought that all humans were God's creation,' 9 it does not follow that all
of God's creations belong solely to him. Even if it did, that does not
mean that God's texts created by human hand should receive special pro-
tection, or should be owned under copyright by God. This gives rise to
problems of textual management: How could humans manage religious
texts that belong wholly to God? How could they decide what needs to
be protected and what does not? In other words, human beings could not
act as stewards of God's copyrights because only God has the right to
control the works He creates. If He did not, then deciding who exactly
had the right to control those works would be a matter of ecclesiastical
handwaving. 93
While many religions do not, strictly speaking, act as if God owns
the works, they do act in a way inconsistent with Lockean principles.
Assuming religious organizations agree that there is no author per se,
they still act as if one exists, often claiming that they are entitled to con-
trol the work. In other words, because God created the work or because
the work is sacred, religious groups seek to control it. The UCS case
provides just such an example. Christian Scientists successfully lobbied
Congress to pass a private law protecting their works because they were
religious and sacred. If the work always was attributed to, or created by,
190. See Menell, supra note 172, at 720-21.
191. See, e.g., Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor
(NCCFE), No. 96-4126, 2000 WL 1028634, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000), vacated, No. 96-
4126, 2004 WL 906301 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 27, 2004); Syn, supra note 152, at 23.
192. Locke, supra note 176, at § 25 (stating that "it is very clear, that God, as king David
says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in com-
mon"). See Shapiro, supra note 176, at 312 ("Locke's frequent appeals to metaphors of
workmanship and watch making in the Two Treatises and elsewhere make it fundamental that
men are obliged to God because of his purpose in making them.").
193. 1 suppose God could delegate this right to humans, but untangling where He did this
in certain works would prove challenging (if not impossible).
Spring 20 101
386 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:355
one individual, this argument might find some traction in Lockean the-
ory. Many times, however, there is no putative owner of the religious
work. In NCCFE, for example, the actual author disclaimed ownership,
yet sought to maintain control over the work to prevent its distortion.
94
In other respects, religious motivations directly clash with the
Lockean View. The Lockean proviso that requires leaving "enough, and
as good" for others, as has been shown, faces problems in copyright law
theory generally. This proviso also encounters problems with respect to
religious motivations. Specifically, if religious organizations seek to
wholly control, and therefore prevent others from seeing or using, reli-
gious works, they are closing a gateway that would otherwise remain
open.' 9' Not only are the religious organizations not leaving "enough,
and as good," for others, they are leaving nothing at all.
96
Although one might rejoin that "enough, and as good" merely means
the ability to write one's own religious work, that point does not address
the problematical uses of religious works.' 97 Individuals are not necessar-
ily looking to write their own work. Often times they are looking to
expound upon, criticize, or analyze a religious work. If this type of use is
censored or prevented entirely, and individuals are left with whatever
remains in the public domain, then there is almost nothing-let alone
"enough, and as good"-left to appropriate. Because hoarding religious
works cuts against this Lockean proviso, religious claims conflict with
Lockean notions of copyright.
The second (no spoilage) proviso also runs counter to religious mo-
tivations for copyright. The social value' 98 of a religious work may
194. 2000 WL 1028634, at *5-6.
195. Theists cannot get around this argument by claiming that the proviso applies only to
those who rightly use God's work, or to only those entitled to use the work. Copyright law
does not differentiate works based on the religious merit of the user-nor should it.
196. Some might argue that a copyright owner's denial to use a work is not equivalent to
waste, as I suggest, because the work still may be available on the copyright owner's terms.
But that objection does not dispense of the argument in this Article; it highlights it. Limiting
uses of religious wcrks to situations dictated by the owner means that any value the work may
have from being used in another way-for comment, criticism, etc.-largely is lost. When
COS, for example, prevents individuals from accessing or using a work except on its terms, it
prevents possible uses of the work that may yield socially beneficial results, and potentially
flouts the fair use doctrine. I am indebted to Tom Cotter for raising this objection.
197. I am indebted to Rebecca Tushnet for raising this objection.
198. Here, social value means the possible value derived from the use of the work by
others. Social value does not mean, then, the "inherent" value of a work, or the value of a
work to members of a certain social group. This view finds support in copyright law, which
recognizes rights in works demonstrating originality, rather than assessing the inherent value
or artistic merit of a particular work. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,
251 (1903) ("It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to con-
stitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits."). See infra Part III.A. Indeed, as the next subpart will show, the basis
for copyright itself is the potential "value" generated by works-i.e., copyright is designed for
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decline if the work is kept secret or at least unavailable for public use.
While the work itself may remain, continual failure to evaluate the text
may make it difficult to evolve and transcend generational and ideologi-
cal shifts. '9 If this is true, religious secrecy or isolation of these works
actually may impede the spread, adoption, or practice of religions.
Regardless, a decline in the social value of the work also deprives
others (nonmembers) of the value of the work. And, if a work possesses
a nominal social value, the ability of an individual to learn from that
work also may be nominal. Additionally, the value of work may decline
if it is not open to criticism or comment, which in themselves may create
valuable works. °° In other words, the value of access cannot be under-
stated.20 ' Yet, when religious organizations seek to maintain doctrinal
purity or censor others, they reduce the social value of the work, violat-
ing the no spoilage proviso, In all of these ways, religious motivations of
censorship and doctrinal purity run against the grain of copyright law.
b. The Property-Like Attributes of Copyright
Lockean theory, then, presents a mixed bag for religious organiza-
tions, and the implications it has for religious organizations extend
beyond basic theory. Locke's theory was one of tangible, not intangible,
property. Although this subpart does not address whether Locke's theory
should apply to copyright, it does examine how, given the differences
between Lockean tangible and intangible property, religious organiza-
tions motivations align or conflict with copyright law's design.
A portion of this task has just been completed; however, another task
lies ahead. This project involves examining the attributes that flow from
a Lockean theory, as to both tangible property and copyrighted material.
the public benefit, hifra Part ll.A.2.ii. It would be backwards to argue that copyright should
protect texts, the content of which contains certain "inherent" qualities, some more than oth-
ers-copyright law treats the contents of all texts equally.
199. To understand how the social value of a work might decline, imagine that it is 1960,
and the television that you have just purchased came with a remote control, as well as a man-
ual to describe how the remote functions. Imagine further that your great-grandchildren find
this manual many years after you are dead. The manual essentially will be useless to them-it
cannot help them use the remote because the television has been destroyed. The manual could
still be used to learn about the workings of the remotes in the 1960s, but it would have lost
some of its original value, which was temporal.
200. That believers might claim the "value" of a religious work is preserved only if it is
free from criticism is dubious. It is not clear how any "value" could be lost from a work being
criticized, discussed, or used. The original work will exist as usual-the only thing that
"changes" is the group of people who use it. Any definition of value that seeks to isolate and
define the value of a copyrighted work by reference to individuals or social groups, as already
discussed, is incompatible with copyright law.
201. Loren, supra note 169, at 7 ("When considering the effects of the marketable right
created by copyright, it is important to remember that knowledge is advanced not only by new
works being created, but by those new works being shared with others as well.").
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As a starting point, one must recognize that copyrighted material has
different attributes from real property. These differences allow us to
highlight how religious motivations for seeking copyright protection do
not comport with the purpose or structure of copyright law.0
The most commonly noted difference between real and intellectual
property is the nonrivalrous nature of intellectual property. Nonrival-
rous property is property that, when used, does not decrease the
amount of property remaining. Larry Lessig explained the use of non-
rivalrous property this way: "A nonrivalrous resource can't be
exhausted."2 °3 Put another way, the use of copyrighted material "does
not prevent the intellectual property owner from simultaneously using
the work.,,204 An easement on real property, however, "invites the entire
public to come onto the property and use it, thus depriving the land-
owner (at least temporarily) of the use and enjoyment of those portions
that others are physically occupying at any point in time, and prevent-
ing him from using the property in any manner inconsistent with the
public's use and enjoyment. 2 °  Because copyrighted materials are non-
rivalrous, so the argument goes, they are unlike real or personal
property, and can be used ad infinitum without the problems that arise
when individuals use tangible property.
Related to the characteristic of nonrivalrousness is the attribute of ex-
clusion. Property rights have been called a "bundle of sticks," with the
most crucial stick being the right to exclude nonowners from using prop-
erty.2° Copyrights are creatures of statutory grant, and without the
Copyright Act, copyright owners would have no right to exclude."" As
Tom Bell points out, copyrights have even "weaker exclusionary rights"
than tangible property or patents,20 8 as the Act fails to exclude nonowners'
202. This subpart explores only those differences between tangible and intellectual prop-
erty that are relevant to this discussion.
203. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 21 (2002).
204. Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth
Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 563 (1998).
205. Id.
206. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (stating that the right
to exclude is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly char-
acterized as property").
207. Tom W. Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Pnqpe,-y Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV.
523, 534 (2008); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE
MIND 17-27 (2008).
208. While Bell's point is well taken, it overlooks the nonrivalrous nature of copyrighted
materials. The fact that rights are weaker for copyrighted works than tangible property is a
function of the differences in rivalrousness. The reason personal uses of copyrighted works are
allowed, whereas they are prohibited in cases of tangible property, is probably because per-
sonal use of tangible property ultimately depletes a finite resource. Copyrighted works are,
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personal uses of a copyrighted work and, in some cases, allows uses over
2019the objections of the owner.
Related to the right to exclude is the right to use property. If the
Copyright Act was nonexistent, "the author of a fixed expressive work
would have no more right to use it than anyone else."' ' What's more,
under the Copyright Act, authors must endure some unauthorized uses-
even some that profit others.2 ' This right is similar to the right of acqui-
sition, which notes that, absent the copyright, authors would, at best,
own title to the tangible copies in their possession."'
We can wrap up and tie off the bundle with the final stick: preserva-
tion. With tangible property, ownership generally exists indefinitely
without action by the owner.2 3 Ownership of a copyright, on the other
hand, is for a fixed term, after which time it enters the public domain.24
Bell's phrasing, which I have adapted, illustrates this difference: tangible
property endures in the hands of the owner; intellectual property assimi-
lates into the public domain.1 5
These attributes present conflicts with the motivations of censorship
and the maintenance of doctrinal purity. For religious organizations, as
for any author of a copyrighted work, the primary problem is the nonri-
valrous nature of, as well as the use and ability to exclude others from
using, copyrighted materials. Religious groups seek to censor other uses
of their works; but the nonrivalrous nature of copyright works makes this
task difficult, especially given the apparent lack of "harm" from the use.
Nevertheless, the fact that a religious work can be used without "de-
pleting" the religious resource does not make the right antithetical to
copyright law. The opposite, in fact, is true. Copyright law was designed
after all, nonrivalrous, and personal uses may affect the profitability of the work, but the work
itself remains undepleted.
209. Id. In this sense, Bell finds copyprivilege to be a more appropriate term than copy-
right. Id. at 535. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107(l )-(4) (2006).
210. Bell, supra note 207, at 535.
211. E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-594 (1994) (holding
that a commercial use of the song "Oh, Pretty Woman" constituted fair use because it parodied
the song and satisfied the test of the four fair-use factors). A forthcoming work explores more
deeply the issue of when and how courts should determine whether a work qualifies as a par-
ody. David A. Simon, Reasonable Perception and Parody in Copyright Law, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (abstract available at http://ssm.conmabstract= 1569193).
212. Bell, supra note 207, at 537.
213. There are some situations, however, where the owner's rights can be extinguished-
as where the land is adversely possessed--or encumbered-as where an easement gives the
public a right of access to the owner's land.
214. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
215. Bell, supra note 207, at 538 ("Tangible property endures; intellectual 'property'
evaporates.").
Spring 20101
390 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:355
because nonrivalrous uses exist. 216 On the other hand, copyright law is a
statutory right-a Congressional grant that allows certain types of exclu-
sions. Simply because a statute protects the author of a work in one way
does not mean it protects her in all ways. Copyright law, for example,
requires the author of the work to endure some unauthorized uses. And
therein lies a conflict between this attribute and the goals of religious
organizations: religious organizations pursue copyright protection to
avoid any unauthorized uses.
Perhaps most importantly for religious organizations, however, are
the rights to possess and preserve intellectual property. With some ex-
ceptions, 2 7 real property can be possessed exclusively forever, and this is
exactly the kind of copyright protection religious organizations seek.
2
,
8
Doctrinal purity, for instance, depends upon eternal ownership; the doc-
trine itself must remain pure forever, not merely for the term of its
copyright. Religious organizations' desire to censor, too, lacks durational
constraints. Squelching criticism and dissent is not an activity that, in the
minds of religious organizations, should be pursued only for the term of
copyright. Criticism and dissent always are detrimental and always
should be suppressed.
Copyright law, however, provides a limited monopoly; the express
purpose of this limited monopoly is to give authors an incentive to create
and distribute their works. Furthermore, copyrighted works never can be
wholly possessed in the way real property can be. The advent of digital
media, and digital networks like peer-to-peer networks, means that copy-
righted material can be possessed only in limited ways, such as through
encryption and the enforcement of legal rights. The implications for reli-
gious organizations are significant. Their use of copyright law to achieve
eternal goals conflicts with the Constitutional "limited times" require-
ment of copyright law. All of the attributes discussed in this subpart
conflict with religious motivations for seeking copyright protection.
2. Historical View (Positive Law)
Many scholars, however, do not agree that a Lockean theory is the
correct justification for copyrights. In fact, these scholars oppose linking
copyrights to Lockean notions of property. To explain why copyrights
lack Lockean foundations, these scholars turn to history. Much of the
216. Indeed, the limited monopolistic rights given to a copyright owner are designed to
provide an incentive to create and distribute the work. That is, if the author knows that she can
recoup her costs of creation by charging a price for the work, she is more likely to create.
217. See supra note 213.
218. United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Board of Directors, 616 F Supp.
476, 477 (D.D.C. 1985) (regarding the successful lobbying of the U.S. Congress for an exten-
sion to the copyright term of several religious works of Christian Science).
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copyright literature has detailed the origins of the first English copyright,
illustrating its incongruous relationship with Lockean notions. It does
not hurt to briefly recount that history here.
A good place to start this brief historical sketch is Rome. The Ro-
mans did not conceive of authors or musicians as owning their works or
performances.2"9 Although legitimate possession of a work entitled Ro-
mans to copy it,220 they did conceptualize (noncodified) rights beyond
mere possession, such as the author's right to prevent unauthorized pub-
lication of their work.22'
England is the next stop on the copyright tour.22 There, the Crown
employed the "printing privilege[, which] was an ad hoc form of poli-
cymaking that could range widely in subject matter, scope, and
duration.,,22' But King Phillip and Queen Mary Tudor decided that this
system, which regulated religious and political speech, was not effective
enough.224 Using the letters patent to create more religious uniformity in
literature, Phillip and Mary granted an exclusive monopoly over book
printing (i.e., a copyright) to the Stationers' Company,2 which, in ex-
change for profits, regulated the content of books by determining which
books to print. 226 The Stationers' Company acted "as the policemen of
the press,2 27 and was granted the right to "the copie" of the work it
printed.220
219. Katharina de la Durantaye, The Origins of the Protections of Literary Authorship in
Ancient Rome, 25 B.U. INT'L L.J. 37, 58 (2007). Romans used their observations about the
natural world to describe a theory of natural law. Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural ILaw:
Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 517, 523 (1990).
220. Durantaye, supra note 219, at 77 (stating that, "in ancient Rome[,] any individual in
legitimate possession of a copy of an already published work could reproduce and distribute
copies of the work at will").
221. Id. at 58-77 (detailing rights, such as moral rights, recognition of authorship rights
and appropriation rights).
222. Yen, supra note 219, at 523. Yen also notes that Locke and the English changed the
effect of natural law. Whereas the Romans thought natural law merely reflected the current
state of men, the English saw natural law as prescribing how the current state of men should
be.
223. Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 907, 921
(2005). The Crown often used the privilege-in the form of the "letters patent" or a "royal
license"-to control what was printed. Id.
224. See O'Melinn, supra note 174, at 153; Yen, supra note 219, at 378.
225. L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v
U.S.A. 365, 377 n.32 (2000) (quoting the language of the charter).
226. Yen, supra note 219, at 525 (noting that the Stationers' Company also had the right
to seize unauthorized presses and regulate content).
227. Patterson, supra note 225, at 377.
228. Id. at 378. Because the right to print particular books was specific to each individ-
ual member of the Stationers' Company, the company needed a system to control its
members-that is, to describe who was entitled to print what. Id. To prevent the chaos that
could have resulted from reckless profit-seeking by individual members of the Stationers'
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And so the first copyright was born. It is important to note that only
booksellers and printers, not authors, could be members of the Stationers'
Company; therefore, only booksellers and printers could own the copy-
right in the individual work.225 Votaries of the Historical View often
emphasize that this copyright-the first copyright-was not derived from
the Lockean theory giving authors rights in their works. To the contrary,
authors had almost no rights in their works.230 Copyrights were devised
originally as a mechanism for content control213 not a system designed for
promoting, or subscribing to a Lockean notion of, authorial rights 232 Even
Augustine Birrell, many years ago, went so far as to state that the "au-
thor's copyright had ... in practice no independent existence. 233
After a series of battles between the Stationers' Company and the
2"34public, and after the abolishment of the Star Chamber, the Parliament
enacted the Statute of Anne (the Statute) in 1709.25 While some scholars
Company, a simple system was adopted: "[a] member who registered the title of a work in the
company register was entitled to 'the copie,' that is copyright, of that work." Id.
229. Id. See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and
Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 249 (2008) ("in England
prior to 17 10, it was stationers and only stationers that could register copyright.").
230. Oren Bracha has pointed out that authors may have had limited rights under the
Stationers' Company system. Id. at 249 n.264. He states that informal norms, "backed by
sporadic formal enforcement[,] ... created" limited rights for authors to compensation and
possibly first publication. Id.
231. Dennis W.K. Khong details the use of copyright for censorship, including the
search and seizure powers of the crown, throughout English history in The Historical Law and
Economics of the First Copyright Act, 2 ERASMUS L. & ECON. REV. 35, 37-42 (2006).
232. Patterson, supra note 225, at 378. Patterson even points out that the Stationers'
Company enacted the first regulations regarding copyright, which it designed to benefit itself,
not authors. Id.
233. AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT
IN BOOKS 74 (1899).
234. The Star Chamber was originally a location at which The Council, a judicial body,
sat. W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 274 (1903). During the 1500s, the Star
Chamber exercised primary jurisdiction over The Council's judicial activities but never seri-
ously became a separate judicial body. Id. at 272. The name itself was said to be derived by
Blackstone from the term "Starra;' which meant the obligations and contracts of the Jews. Id.
at 272-73. The prominent room that was appropriated to the council at the exchequer at
Westminster in which these cases were heard became known as the "Star Chamber." Id. The
Star Chamber heard only certain cases (both civil and criminal), and not all matters that the
Star Chamber heard were heard by The Council. Id. at 274, 279-280. Although its jurisdiction
extended only to certain matters, those matters concerned the state or private parties. Id. at
279. In fact, the Star Chamber "continually interfered with private disputes." Id. at 281. The
Star Chamber also engaged in administrative duties. Id. at 272-78. Because its growing role
constituted a threat to the common law and many lawyers' occupational sustenance, id. at
285-86, 289-90, the Star Chamber was abolished by an act establishing the Privy Council in
1640. Id. at 278.
235. Although Parliament enacted the Statute in 1709, it did not go into effect until April
of 1710. Patterson, supra note 225, at 374 n.26. During its tenure as the censorship machine,
the Stationers' Company continually sought increases in its power from the Star Chamber. Id.
at 378-79. But after the abolishment of the Star Chamber in 1640, the Stationers' Company
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have stated that the interest for the enactment of the Statute was eco-
nomic,23 all agree that its purpose was devoted to the public interest. 37
There is evidence that the Statute was drafted with reference to both the
stationers' copyright and the Licensing Act of 1662, "presumably to
make sure that undesirable features of the stationers' copyright protec-
tion by provisions of that statute were not part of the new statutory
copyright.2 38 Furthermore, Dennis Khong notes that drafter Edward
Wortley's first composition of the Statute did not include the word "vest-
ing" in the title; it read "A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning and
for Securing the Property of Copies of Books to the Rightful Owners
thereof."'239 Khong has suggested that the change in language indicates
that the House of Lords, by using the term "vesting," created the copy-
right-whereas the use of the word "securing" would have meant
copyrights existed already, and were merely being codified.
40
The copyright to which the author became entitled, however, had
its limits. First, the duration was limited to two fourteen-year terms,
with the second term renewable only if the author was living at end of
the first term; if the author was dead, the copyright lapsed and the work
entered the public domain. Second, the Statute was devoted to the
lost much of its power, though not much of its zeal, and it continually lobbied Parliament to
increase its monopoly. Yen, supra note 219, at 525. It achieved its aim to some degree when
Parliament enacted the Licensing Act of 1662, which continued the booksellers' monopoly.
Patterson, supra note 225, at 379. That victory, however, was short-lived. The sunset provision
in the Act was allowed to lapse in 1694, and the booksellers' renewed efforts to regain their
monopoly-lobbying Parliament for new Acts in 1703, 1706, and 1709-proved unavailing.
Khong, supra note 228, at 41.
Unfortunately for the booksellers, their efforts produced a radically new statute in 1709:
the Statute of Anne. Patterson, supra note 225, at 379. Unlike the previous statutes that
granted the booksellers a monopoly for the purposes of censorship and corporate profit, the
Statute of Anne was entitled, "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Cop-
ies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
mentioned." Id. at 374-75.
236. Yen, supra note 219, at 526.
237. Id.; Patterson, supra note 225, at 379-80. Also, it is important not lose sight of what
is meant by "public interest." A recent discussion with a friend causes me to fear the reader
will devolve into a semantic attack on the term "public interest." As a general note, public
interest means that the statute was enacted to benefit the public as a whole, not the individuals
who retain the copyright.
238. Patterson, supra note 225, 376.
239. Khong, supra note 231, at 44.
240. Id. (citing MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 43
(1993)). While the change in prose is an interesting point that illuminates the possible in-
tended meaning of the Statute, it should be obvious that it does not conclusively determine any
question about what attributes copyrights should have. Whatever weight we afford to the au-
thor's use of words, we ultimately can decide that he was wrong (or right), and we can
evaluate the essence of copyright apart from any statute or words.
241. Patterson, supra note 225, at 379.
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public interest.242 Additionally, the Statute seemed to apply to only liter-
ary authors and booksellers, excluding the creators of paintings, songs,
etc.243 Scholars emphasize these points to show how the original authorial
copyright grew out of a desire to destroy a censorship-copyright and to
promote the public interest, not out of a natural law theory of property.
Although copyright in the United States has some traces of natural
law,' " its justification-like the statute upon which it was based, the
Statute of Anne241-1ies in the public interest. Article I, Section 8, of the
Constitution states the following: "The Congress shall have power...
[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries. 246 While the Constitutional Convention yielded
almost no records of the Founders' thoughts on copyright law,2 47 the
Copyright Clause and its antecedents show the United States adopted a
copyright system primarily focused on the public benefit, though the
241proprietary interest of the author did receive some attention.
242. Id. at 368. Patterson's basic argument can be phrased as a syllogism: Congress has
the power to create copyrights only in those things that are original creations and cannot ex-
propriate anything in the public domain. Copyrights are limited and eventually lapse into the
public domain. Therefore, a primary purpose of copyrights is to protect the public domain.
243. Carroll, supra note 223, at 923 n.74.
244. See Patterson, supra note 225, at 392. See also Yen, supra note 219, at 529; Jane
Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America,
64 TUL. L. REV. 991 passim (1990). Patterson notes that "[wihile the monopolists failed in
their use of the author in seeking to override the Statute of Anne, they made natural law copy-
right a part of Anglo-America copyright jurisprudence in the form of the common law
copyright." Patterson, supra note 225, at 392. Professor Jane Ginsburg observes that some of
the early U.S. state copyright laws were author centered. Ginsburg, supra, at 995. She goes on
to discuss sources from the late 1700s-such as essays, academic letters, and state statutes-
to argue that Lockean conceptions of authorship were "acknowledged." Id. at 1000.
245. Patterson, supra note 225, at 374.
246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
247. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2
J. INTELL. PROP. L. I, 23-45 (1994). Walterscheid details the lack of records on the question
of why the Copyright Clause was included and proposes several theories to explain this fact.
Id. As an added bonus, he concludes that Charles Pinckney and James Madison played the
most active role in the inclusion of the Copyright Clause, with Pinckney initially introducing
the idea. Id. at 46-47. While Pinckney's motives were less apparent, Madison's objectives, as
a scholar, seem to have been to protect the author's work. Id. at 47-48.
248. Although the Copyright Clause was based on the Statute of Anne, Patterson, supra
note 225, at 374, as the law crossed the ocean, the nautical winds bent copyright theory in a
different direction than that taken in Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. (4th Ed.) 2408, 2417, 98
Eng. Rep. 257, 262 (H.L. 1774), where the House of Lords ruled that no common law copy-
right existed. Yen, supra note 219, at 529; Patterson, supra note 225, at 383 ("History before
1787 demonstrates the English concern for the primitive copyright in the form of a natural (or
common) law monopoly, and history after 1787 shows that this concern was transferred to the
United States."). A broad reading of Donaldson would eliminate a natural law theory of copy-
right, but "early Americans saw copyright as a matter of both economic policy and natural
In Search of (Maintaining) the Truth
But the legal system based this dualism (public interest versus au-
thors' rights) on two entirely different legal sources. Whereas the natural
law theory of copyright found its roots in the common law, the public
interest framework had a Constitutional basi. 249 On their face, then,
there is a powerful difference between the two rights. This difference is
made even more powerful because the 1976 Copyright Act abolished the
common-law authorial property-right. '5 °
law." Yen, supra note 219, at 529 (emphasis added); Ginsburg, supra note 247, at 995, 999-
1001 & n.44 (explaining that some early American state copyright laws reflected concerns for
authors' rights as a result of lobbying by author%). This argument is based on language from
the State Constitutions existing at the time of the Constitutional Convention, as well as state-
ments made by James Madison reflecting this belief. Id. at 528-29. Despite this, another
scholar claims that Madison "extolled the Constitution's Copyright and Patent Clause because
the 'public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.'" O'Melinn,
supra note 174, at 159. In other words, Madison's support for the limited monopoly conferred
by the Copyright Clause emanated from his desire for copyrights to benefit the public, not
from the natural law theory (of authorship). James Boyle also supports the view that the influ-
ential architects (e.g., Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, etc.) of U.S. intellectual property
rights were concerned primarily with the public benefit, and sought to achieve that aim by
providing the author with a carefully circumscribed and limited monopoly. BOYLE, supra note
207, at 257 n.19. Boyle wonders, somewhat rhetorically, whether the natural-law discussions
of copyright among the Founders were "signal[s] or noise?" Id.
In any event, the colonists had no formal copyright practice. Walterscheid, supra note
247, at 20. And, while the individual states enacted some copyright laws, Alfred C. Yen, The
Interdisciplinarv Future of Copyright Theor., 10 CAROOo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 423, 428 (1992)
(pointing out at least seven states had copyright clauses with preambles that suggested a natu-
ral-law basis for American copyright law), there is not "much evidence of any early state
copyright practice." Walterscheid, supra note 247, at 20. Notwithstanding this fact, the copy-
right question endured, and from 1783 to 1786, several states enacted copyright laws. Id. at 22
(noting that scholars have suggested that these statutes were never operable). Patterson notes
that "twelve of thirteen states (all except Delaware) had used the Statute of Anne as a model
for enacting state copyright statutes during the period of Confederation-from 1783 to 1786."
Patterson, supra note 225, at 374.
But that tide shifted, and the Articles of Confederation were amended because adminis-
tering numerous copyright systems became unduly complex. Walterscheid, supra note 244, at
22-23. The earliest known formal discussion of federal copyright law came in the form of a
resolution at the Continental Congress, May 2, 1787, and it hinted at a system of copyright
founded upon propriety and public interest. Id. at 20.
249. Patterson, supra note 225, at 392.
250. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006) ("On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103,
whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right
in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State."); Laws v. Sony Music En-
tertainment, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137 (2006) ("Congress explained what the statute made
obvious: '[tihe intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common
law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works, within the
scope of the Federal copyright law.' ") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976)). But
see 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(I)-(4) (stating that "[niothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to," among other things,
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The Historical View, at the very least, gives an argument about the
wrongheaded nature of our copyright system today. It points out that the
Natural Law View of copyright is neither required by the English origins
of copyright, nor is it a natural outgrowth of our own copyright system.
History shows that copyright law finds its primary justification as a tool
for promoting the public interest and protecting the public domain.
If the votaries of the Historical View are correct, religious motiva-
tions for copyright are seriously misguided. The Statute of Anne, the
Statute after which the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention mod-
eled the Copyright Clause, was designed to destroy the censorship that
had plagued England under the Stationers' Company. But one of the two
primary reasons religious organizations seek to use copyright is to cen-
sor others' writings. In preventing bad publicity, squelching criticism and
dissent, and stifling competition, religious organizations' uses of copy-
right seek to unravel the basic principles that the Statute of Anne and the
Copyright Clause wove together. In other words, religious organizations'
attempt to censor others' works looks more like Queen Mary and King
Phillip's regulation, and less like the Statute of Anne and the Copyright
Clause's public-interest-centered incentives. For that reason, the reli-
gious organizations' desire to use copyright law to censor others
conflicts with the law's most basic goal.
Furthermore, on the Historical View, religious uses of copyright to
maintain doctrinal purity seem fundamentally wrong. The Historical
View posits that copyright law was created to promote the public inter-
est, and did not originate from any natural law philosophy. Religious
motivations for seeking copyright protection and enforcement, by con-
trast, ground themselves in the right to control. Thus, they find support
in a natural law justification of copyright-one that presupposes an au-
thorial right to at least some control of the work. But without that natural
law justification, attempts to maintain doctrinal purity lose legal support.
Focusing on the public interests substantially dilutes the author's right,
which includes, in some way or another, the ability to control the work.
This renders the religious claim-the claim that a religious work needs
works not fixed in a tangible medium of expression). Patterson notes that proponents of au-
thorial rights may have sought to merge into the statutory framework the property fight
created by common law. Patterson, supra note 225, at 380-81 (explaining how booksellers
sought a copyright based on natural rights in the legendary "Battle of the Booksellers"); id. at
387-88 (explaining how natural law theory slips into U.S. copyright in, for example, the right
to copy). But, he argues, given Parliament's elimination of the common law right-and the
United States' general adoption of the Statute's framework (carefully circumscribed copyright,
fear of monopoly, and a design to further the public interest)-common law copyright was all
but dead. Id. at 381-83, 390-92. Since the Copyright Clause is aimed at promoting the public
interest and (almost) no common law authorial right exists, there is little to no justification for
retaining a natural law theory of copyright today, many argue.
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to be preserved in its "pure form"-effete. Without a natural law theory
of copyright, religious organizations must rely on economic rationales,
which, as this subpart has shown, conflict, though not entirely, with reli-
gious motivations for copyright protection.
The only saving grace for religious groups is the fact that modern
U.S. copyright does have some natural law inclinations.25 ' As a corollary,
claims of control and rights of ownership thus have more validity than
the Historical View would otherwise permit. Thus, while the Historical
View of copyright does clash with religious motivations, the implications
of this clash under current copyright law are not as prominent as the pro-
ponents of the Historical View might like.
C. Cultural Theory
Often overlooked or unnoticed are the cultural theorists. Unlike eco-
nomic theorists, cultural theorists employ "literatures and methodologies
that focus on the interactions between self and culture."2' 2 Rights-based
theorists,"3 such as property-rights theorists, view (and therefore dis-
miss) cultural theorists as lacking a norm-creating structure. In some
sense, rights-based theorists cannot accept a relativist conception of law
because law is normative by design. Julie Cohen argues that this aversion
is driven by a fear of undermining traditional conceptions of individual
autonomy by cultural theorists' focus on the "endogenous relationship of
self to culture, '9 4 or merely out of disdain for postmodernism and the
"pernicious relativism" cultural theory represents.
But, at its core, cultural theory seeks to understand copyright law as
a constantly evolving and shifting series of events; 256 there is no absolut-
ist framework from which copyrights should emanate. This means that
251. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) (describing moral rights for certain works); supra
note 241. But see, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (1 lth Cir.
2001) ("[C]opyright does not immunize a work from comment and criticism."); id. at 1283
("Copyright law is not designed to stifle critics." (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438
(9th Cir. 1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
252. Cohen, supra note 150, at 1156.
253. Rights-based theories are those that premise the existence of copyright on funda-
mental rights, such as right to one's labor, instead of focusing on consequentialist theories, as
does the economic theory of copyright.
254. Cohen, supra note 150, at 1157.
255. Id. at 1162.
256. Id. at 1165-66 ("This account seeks to understand how existing knowledge systems
have evolved, and how they are encoded and enforced. It explores the dialectic between settled
truths and disruptive upheavals, and seeks to illumine the ways in which particular innovations
become accepted as truth or enshrined as artistically valid."); Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond
Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725,
727, 728-42 (1993) (using literary theory to critique copyright work, and asserting that all
works are "unstable and dependent upon context").
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cultural theorists do not so much justify the system of copyrights as seek
to explain that system and offer insights into how it might function bet-ter.- 257
The fundamental pillar, or normative commitment, of cultural theory
is that systems of knowledge not become entrenched or ossified.2", The
idea of cultural theory, which is not uniform, is that methods of under-
standing are constantly evolving, and copyright law is no exception.
While cultural theorists agree that copyright law should promote "pro-
gress," they differ from rights-based theorists on what "progress" means.
Cohen argues that cultural theorists construe "progress" to have a
broader meaning: "progress consists ... in that which causes knowledge
systems to come under challenge and sometimes to shift.' 259 In other
words, progress is anything that creates new ideas, or at least new ideas
that challenge old ideas in some way.2 ° Cultural theorists also evaluate
the current social framework for rewarding and internalizing "pro-
,,261gress.
257. See id. at 729 ("In suggesting a reevaluation of how copyright approaches the
'work,' this Article suggests an alternative structure-a different way of looking at what copy-
right protects-that can bring the policies underlying the central decisions in a copyright case
into sharper focus. In this sense, the Article is descriptive rather than prescriptive."). See id. at
750 ("i emphasize that this discussion does not seek to dictate how copyright's approach to
originality should be, but rather how, in light of contemporary literary theory, the inquiry into
'originality' might be refocused to consider the policies underlying the protection of copy-
righted texts."); Peter Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
"Authorship", 1991 DUKE L. J. 455, 456 (1991) (noting that his article critiquing the copy-
right law concept of "authorship" "says little about what the content of copyright law should
be"). Perhaps this statement is too strong. After all, cultural theory understands culture and
creativity in a particular way, and it advocates a system of copyright that most efficaciously
promotes this understanding. Nevertheless, it is harder to characterize cultural theory as a
justification because it is grounded in observations rather than a normative theory. In other
words, cultural theory explains how culture functions (i.e., constantly changes) and seeks to
promote the relationships that it explains. Nevertheless, the rights-based approaches can still
add valuable structure to copyright in cultural theory, as Cohen argues. Cohen, supra note 150,
at 1195-97 (explaining what cultural theory adds to copyright theory generally, and how it
encourages using a variety of different methodologies to shape copyright law).
258. Cohen, supra note 150, at 1168.
259. Id.
260. Margaret Chon, Postrnodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 101 (1993) (stating that "postmodem 'Progress' deconstructs
the linear and forward nature of 'Progress' (postmodem progress is circular, sideways, or even
upside-down)"); id. at 123-134 (detailing the postmodern approach to "Progress" and how it
differs from the contemporary approach, stating that "'[plostmodern' progress is ... consis-
tent with the 'bottom-up' approach of postmodemism, one that recognizes that 'progressive'
acts may be backward as well as forward, perhaps sideways, and most often circular (as ex-
emplified by the accelerated reflexivity of knowledge").
261. Cohen, supra note 150, at 1168 (stating that "a postmodernist approach to knowl-
edge demands careful attention to social, cultural, and legal mechanisms for evaluating,
rewarding, and internalizing progress").
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The main resource for evaluating cultural progress, then, is the
thought-structure with which it is analyzed.26 ' Born from this thinking is
the belief that copyright should be re-examined from a culturalist per-
spective. The observations made should be used to realign the current
legal framework of copyright law. For example, Cohen describes tradi-
tional economic and philosophical theories as obsessed with abstraction,
"presum[ing] access to extant cultural resources regardless of their loca-
tion in space and time. 263 Cultural theorists, by contrast, view culture
and creation as limited by "the ubiquity of constraint in the creative
process," or "situatedness. 'M In other words, individuals can create cul-
ture based on only their current context (i.e., inasmuch as their current
culture, time, location, etc. allow).
From this standpoint, it is easy to see how cultural theories, such as
strict constructivist theory of technology (SCOT)-which asserts that
texts have no fixed meanings-arise.2 5 While Cohen uses SCOT as a
starting, rather than ending, point, she does advocate the application of
variant theories to copyright, using them to create new understandings of
copyright and to critique the existing legal framework.2' 6 She finds sup-
port in this understanding within the "creative play" school of
psychology, which holds that the individual lacks control, to some de-
261gree, over what the individual creates. Cultural theorists posit that
understanding culture and the creative process as fluid and (to some de-
gree) uncontrollable will aid our analysis of copyright law generally.
268
In the end, this understanding leaves us with a conception of copyright
law that is fundamentally different than rights-based or consequentialist
theories. First, it deemphasizes copyright law's incentivizing role
269
262. Cohen devotes much of her article to a discussion of how cultural theory critiques
copyright in ways different from theories grounded economics or political philosophy. Those
critiques derive from the idea that cultural theorists evaluate copyright and its goals from fun-
damentally different perspective-one which, for example, views the idea/expression
dichotomy as an abstraction that obfuscates the study of the transmission of culture and
"makes grappling with difficult policy choices in copyright even more difficult than it ought to
be." Id. at 1175-76.
263. Id. at 1180.
264. Id. at 1178.
265. Id. at 1184.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1190 (discussing how philosophical and economic justifications view the
individual as intentionally creating creative works, and explaining how some psychology stud-
ies support the opposite view). This view also finds support in creativity research and moral
rights scholarship. See generally, Simon, supra note 169.
268. Id. at 1187 (explaining how her discussion of culture as networks illustrates the
numerous interaction points of copyright and culture, which say something about copyright
itself).
269. By "incentivizing role" I mean the view that copyright is a vehicle to spur creativity
and innovation.
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because creative products are the result of serendipity and constraint
rather than pure intention. 7° Second, since cultural theory, unlike rights-
based utilitarian theories, explains the harm of rigid controls on situated
users of culture, it provides a stronger argument for fewer legal con-
straints.27' Yet, a cultural theory of copyright does not abandon wholesale
the ideas of economic and rights-based theories. Instead, Cohen argues
these are necessary to complete the cultural theories, blending elements
from a variety of disciplines to make a framework that can accommodate
the ever-shifting nature of copyright.
272
In almost every way, the cultural theory of copyright conflicts with
the religious motivations of censorship and doctrinal purity. While cul-
tural theorists abhor the "ossification" of knowledge systems, religious
groups extol and pursue it. Preserving a doctrine and preventing it from
criticism is antithetical to the cultural theory, but it is essential for many
religious groups. A religious organization that sought, for example, to
maintain its doctrine would ardently resist the argument that its doctrine
could not and should not be maintained.
Moreover, theories like SCOT clash so drastically with religious moti-
vations for copyright that it is difficult to see how the two could co-exist.
SCOT claims that there is no fixed meaning in a text; religious organiza-
tions often claim there is only one true and absolute meaning. Religion
groups may make the less-categorical claim that a religious text has multi-
ple true and absolute meanings. But these true and absolute meanings are
derived from, and fixed (i.e., they are diachronically stable) by, precise
religious language.
Religious texts and religions are not, at least in the minds of reli-
gious organizations, uncontrollable, constantly evolving cultural
elements. Religious motivations for copyright are almost exclusively
about having or maintaining control over the meaning of a text. The ob-
jective of doctrinal purity, as evidenced by the UCS case, is to maintain
control of doctrine and ensure its stasis. Religious organizations would
not pursue this objective if they thought their doctrine had, or should
have, more than one meaning. A similar statement can be made about the
desire of religious organizations to censor. Censorship, as we have seen,
is a tool used by religious organizations to prevent criticism of their doc-
trine--or anything that might suggest their doctrine is wrong or
misguided. Achieving that objective would be meaningless if religions
accepted that their works had more than one meaning.
270. Cohen, supra note 150, at 1193.
271. Id. at 1193-94.
272. Id. at 1197-98.
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The contrast in theory is evident. Religious organizations argue that
their texts transcend time and space and exist as universal truths. For
cultural theorists, the idea of universal truths, let alone those embodied
in a text, are not only quixotic, but fantastical. Yet, religious organiza-
tions maintain that their texts are universally applicable and must be
preserved in that form. Doctrinal purity depends, after all, on the main-
tenance of sacred texts in their pure form.271
On its most basic level, cultural theory articulates reasons opposite
to the religious motivations for pursuing copyright. While religious or-
ganizations seek to maintain the meaning of their works, some cultural
theories hypothesize that works do not have fixed meanings. Further-
more, cultural theory argues that individuals are limited in what they
create by their situatedness.2 74 In direct conflict with religious motiva-
tions, cultural theory asserts "that the text is not a line of words releasing
a single 'theological meaning' (the 'message' of an Author-God) but a
multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them
original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from
innumerable centers of culture 2 7- For these reasons, religious organiza-
tions seeking copyright protection do so for reasons antithetical to a
cultural theory of copyright law.
III. DOCTRINAL OBSTACLES TO RELIGIOUSLY-MOTIVATED
USES OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The previous Parts have shown that religious organizations pursue
copyright protection and enforcement primarily to maintain the purity of
their doctrine, or to censor others' uses of their religious texts. These two
reasons, as we have seen, conflict with the underlying principles of
copyright and clash with nearly all theories of copyright. That analysis,
however, did not elaborate on whether copyright could, in fact, be used
to achieve the goals of religious organizations.
That is the aim of this Part. Better phrased, the inquiry is this: irre-
spective of the conflict articulated in Part II, do the basic copyright law
273. Doctrinal purity also depends on practice. An unchanged text may still result in
changing doctrine if the text is disregarded or not used at all. Despite this fact, textual mainte-
nance goes a long way toward preserving doctrinal purity using texts-and toward
maintaining an unchanging religious practice.
274. In some ways, the idea of situatedness might not clash entirely with religious be-
liefs. The NCFFE case, for example, may illustrate that religions often believe that a sacred
text must be limited by the author's ability to write it, drawing on his own experiences.
275. Rotstein, supra note 256, at 737-38 (quoting ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE, MUSIC,
TEXT 146 (1967), quoted in JOHNATHAN D. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND
CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM (1982)).
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doctrines impede or facilitate the success of religious groups' attempts to
censor or maintain doctrinal purity? The most logical place to begin this
inquiry is with the prominent copyright doctrines that exist in U.S. copy-
right law today. In describing these doctrines, this Part assesses how
each doctrine fits with religious uses. It bears emphasizing that each doc-
trine is assessed on its ability to achieve religious goals, not on whether
the principles underlying the doctrine conflicts with these goals.27 6 This
Article concludes that copyright law doctrine in most cases inhibits the
achievement of religious goals. That conclusion is reached after examin-
ing the following doctrines: originality, copyrightability, the merger
doctrine, substantial similarity, and fair use.
A. Originality
To create a copyrightable work, the law requires that the work be
"original.,,277 The Supreme Court expounded upon this requirement in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 218 At issue was
the copyrightability of an alphabetically organized phonebook.27 9 The
Court, before reaching its conclusion, highlighted the importance of
originality in copyright: "The sine qua non of copyright is originality";28 °
indeed, "[i]t is the very 'premise of copyright law.' ,,281
The Court observed in Feist that, in the past, some courts mistakenly
invented "a new theory .... [k]nown as 'sweat of the brow' or 'industri-
ous collection,'" which viewed "copyright [as] a reward for the hard
work that went into compiling facts."2 82 The Supreme Court stated that
"without a doubt, the 'sweat of the brow' doctrine flouted basic copy-
right principles.,,
283
Religious organizations would probably agree that originality is
more important than the amount of effort used to create the work.28 The
276. The harmonization of religious goals with the principles of copyright law is differ-
ent from copyright law doctrine's ability to achieve religious goals. This Part's inquiry is
concerned only with copyright doctrine, not the underlying principles giving rise to those
doctrines.
277. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.....
278. 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991).
279. Id. at 342-43.
280. Id. at 345 (second emphasis added).
281. Id. at 347.
282. Id. at 352.
283. Id. at 354.
284. While the originality requirement is philosophically inconsistent with the natural
law theory of copyright-and thus with many religious reasons for seeking copyright-it is
not a doctrinal bar for religious organizations seeking copyright protection. Nevertheless, it
does cause problems for religious organizations seeking to attribute their works to divine au-
thors. Although religious organizations have not lost their copyright claims on this basis alone,
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reason for this is because God's word, in the eyes of the believer, must
be original. So, the originality requirement in the abstract probably is not
objectionable to religious organizations. Problems arise, however, when
religious organizations seek copyright protection for works authored by
a supernatural being."5
The originality requirement also undermines both the quest for doc-
trinal purity and the attempt to censor other groups' use of the religious
work. Because the copyright extends only to original works of author-
ship, their religious doctrine that the text embodies will not be protected
entirely. Instead, copyright protects only the original expressions con-
tained in the work. Preserving doctrinal purity will, therefore, be difficult
because other groups can copy the ideas that the text embodies, as well
as the noncopyrightable expressions that the work contains. Additionally,
censoring works wholesale will be difficult. Because critics or dissidents
may be able to copy certain unoriginal portions of a work verbatim, or
criticize the ideas embodied in the works, the concept of originality fur-
ther conflicts with religious motivations for copyright protection.
B. Copyrightability of Facts and Compilations
286Much like ideas, facts are not copyrightable. Unlike ideas, how-
ever, compilations of facts are copyrightable.2 7 These compilations, of
course, must be original: the author must arrange the facts or data in a
manner that merits copyrightability. To the extent that the compilation
is original, copyright law protects it.188 The law, however, does not pro-
tect the facts contained in the compilation, or an unoriginal arrangement
of the facts. Individuals can quote factual works more liberally than
they have not been able to secure their copyrights in the manner they desire. The reason is
because courts use the originality requirement to eschew divine claims of authorship. While
this subject could be grouped under the heading of "originality," I have placed it infra Part
IlI.B.
285. See infra Part III.B.
286. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991)
(stating that "facts are not copyrightable").
287. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) ("The subject matter of copyright as specified by section
102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexist-
ing material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully."); Feist, 499 U.S. at 344 (stating "that compilations of facts
generally are" copyrightable).
288. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) ("The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends
only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preex-
isting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material.").
Spring 20101
404 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review IVol. 16:355
nonfactual works.2' 9 Nevertheless, because compilations are copyright-
able, other can infringe them.
Underneath the umbrella of copyrightability, religious organizations
encounter problems. In particular, a problem arises when a group or in-
dividual claims the author is a supernatural being.9 Because a
supernatural author cannot hold a copyright or create a copyrightable
work,29' religious organizations cannot argue that "Jesus," for example,
created or owns the copyright to a work. Instead, where the plaintiff
claims a divine or supernatural author, three scenarios result.
1. Finding the Work Qualifies as a "Literary Work"
First, the court may find copyrightability by disregarding the "di-
vine" nature of the book and hold that it still qualifies as a "literary
work," regardless of whether "the [work's] authorship stem[s] from hu-
man effort. 292 In Urantia I, for example, the plaintiff sued for copyright
infringement but claimed its work was written by God.293 The district
judge originally punted on the metaphysical issue, stating:
As a judge, I cannot-I must not-declare for anyone the truth
or nontruth of an article of faith. If I were to declare The Urantia
Book to be a divine revelation dictated by divine beings, I would
be trampling upon someone's religious faith. If I declared the
opposite, I would be trampling upon someone else's religious
faith. I shall do neither. Whether The Urantia Book is a divine
revelation dictated by divine beings is irrelevant to the issue of
whether the book is a literary work within the meaning of 17
U.S.C. § 102.94
289. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) ("The
law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or
fantasy.").
290. See, e.g., Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor
(NCCFE), No. 96-4126, 2000 WL 1028634, at *1 I (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000), vacated, No. 96-
4126, 2004 WL 906301 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 27, 2004).
291. Urantia Found. v. Maaherra (Urantia 11), 114 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting
that, while "[t]he copyright laws ... do not expressly require 'human' authorship[,] ... it is
not creations of divine beings that the copyright laws were intended to protect, and that in this
case some element of human creativity must have occurred in order for the [work at issue] to
be copyrightable").
292. Urantia Found. v. Maaherra (Urantia I), 895 F. Supp. 1337, 1338 (D. Ariz. 1995)
(stating "that the uncontroverted evidence is that The Urantia Book is a 'literary work[]' [be-
cause] [tlhe work itself 'possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity' ").
293. Id. at 1338.
294. Id.
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Thus, the judge disclaimed a religious basis for his decision and used
copyright principles to decide the dispute. The judge found that the work
qualified for copyright protection as a "literary work. 29
2. Copyrightable Contributions or Selection and Arrangement
Second, a court may find the work copyrightable on the basis of the
individual's contributions, or her selection or arrangement of material in
the work, like the courts did in Urantia H and NCCFE.296 In Urantia H,
the Ninth Circuit used the originality requirement to avoid deciding the
metaphysical question. It focused on the neutral purpose of copyright
law: although the plaintiff claimed the work's author was a divine being,
the court held that individuals who wrote the book exercised a sufficient
degree of originality to render it copyrightable when they "compiled,
selected, coordinated, and arranged" it.
297
The NCCFE court used a similar strategy. The "[d]efendants main-
tain[ed] that [the] [pilaintiffs d[id] not possess a valid copyright because
the Course [was] not an original work of Schucman but of Jesus. 298 Be-
cause the court could not resolve the question of whether Jesus in fact
used Schucman as a scribe, it eschewed the defendants' argument. In-
stead of evaluating the validity of the religious claim of authorship, the
primary inquiry became whether Schucman's contribution constituted a
sufficient amount of originality in which copyright could inhere. It stated
that, while the plaintiffs "have repeatedly asserted that Jesus dictated the
Course to Schucman," "it is not disputed that the arrangement of the ma-
terials in the Course was initiated by Schucman, with assistance from
Thetford, Wapnick, and others."2 Using Urantia as a template, the court
stated:
[E]ven if the Course came from Jesus, significant aspects of it are
the direct result of it having come through Schucman. In this way,
Schucman is as much an author as the members of the Contact
Commission in Urantia, since even Defendants in this action have
295. Id.
296. Urantia It, 114 F.3d at 958; Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of
Full Endeavor (NCCFE), No. 96-4126, 2000 WL 1028634, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000),
vacated, No. 96-4126, 2004 WL 906301 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 27, 2004) (finding that the individual
who wrote the religious work, even if he believed Jesus dictated it to him, was the author of
that work).
297. Urantia II, 114 F.3d at 958 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101); see also Oliver v. Saint Ger-
main Found., 41 F. Supp. 296, 299 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (holding that originality of a "factual"
religious work may be found in the "arrangement, manner and style," but noted that the plain-
tiff had not claimed the defendant infringed that aspect of the work).
298. NCCFE, 2000 WL 1028634, at *9.
299. Id. at * 10.
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essentially conceded that had the Course been channeled through
any other individual, its form would have been different. °°
In other words, Schucman's contributions had the requisite degree of
originality to be copyrightable.
3. Factual Estoppel
Finally, if prior to litigation the religious group represents the work
as factual, then during litigation claims it to be nonfactual, the court may
use factual estoppel to bar the existence of a valid copyright."' The
courts in Oliver, °2 Arica,3°3 and NCCFE0" analyzed this issue.
In Oliver, the court noted that the writer of the religious work be-
lieved that God authored the work.3 °5 The court stated that, while "[tihe
law deals with realities and does not recognize communication with and
the conveyances of legal rights by the spiritual world as the basis for its
judgment[,] ... equity and good morals will not permit one who asserts
something as a fact ... to change that position for profit in a law suit."
' ' 6
In other words, factual estoppel prevented the plaintiff from claiming
something as an "original work of authorship" when he previously as-
serted that the work was a factual one that he did not create.
Many years later, the court in Arica took a similar approach. There,
the copyright holder of religious works asserted that its works were "dis-
covered" and contained "scientifically verifiable 'facts' of human
nature. 3 °7 The court gave one example of these factual claims: the relig-
ion's founder had asserted in a publication that "'[t]he nine fixations, as
well as the entire Arica system, are based upon our proven scientific
knowledge.' ,3 The founder further stated that "'the entire system [is]
300. Id.
301. Arica Institute v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir. 1992). Factual estoppel did
not apply where the plaintiff argued that Jesus dictated the work to him. NCCFE, 2000 WL
1028634, at *12. Factual estoppel, said the court, applies only when the plaintiff claims that
the contents of the work are factual. Id.
302. 41 F. Supp. 296, 298 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
303. 970 F.2d at 1075.
304. 2000 WL 1028634, at * 12.
305. 41 F. Supp. at 298-99 ("It is perfectly clear, therefore, that [the plaintiff] wished to
impress in the strongest terms possible, his sincere belief in the truthfulness of his statement
that he, a mortal being, was not the author, and to induce those who might read to believe that
it was dictated by a superior spiritual being, whose motive was to uplift and benefit the human
race spiritually, religiously and morally.").
306. Id. at 299.
307. Arica, 970 F.2d at 1075.
308. Id. (quoting Letter from Oscar Ichazo, in LETTERS TO THE SCHOOL 9 (Arica Insti-
tute Press ed., 1988)).
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scientific, in the laboratory and clinically.' "09 Yet, "[o]n appeal, Arica
argue[d] that its statements [were] only metaphoric claims of philoso-
phical truth."' ' The court rejected this tactical shift; echoing Oliver, it
stated that, "[h]aving expressly represented to the World that [the foun-
der's] theories are factual, . . . Arica is not now permitted to make an
inconsistent claim so as to better serve its position in litigation."3"'
The NCCFE also examined this issue, though it reached a conclu-
sion opposite to the Arica court's. Although Schucman, the creator of the
work in NCCFE, claimed that Jesus had dictated the Course that he
wrote, the court held that fact inapposite to its factual estoppel determi-
nation.3 '2 Instead, the court focused on the content of the Course. The
court stated Schucman's belief in divine dictation "only [sic] demon-
strates that Plaintiffs have stated on many occasions their belief that it
was Jesus who dictated the" work to Schucman.' 3 In other words, a be-
lief that Jesus had dictated the work did not constitute a claim that the
contents of the work were factual. 314 "[E]ven if it could be established as
a 'fact' that Jesus dictated the Course to Schucman, it would not make
the material in the Course factual[] . . . [because] [m]uch of the Course is
prescriptive rather than descriptive."3 ' For those reasons, the court held
that factual estoppel did not apply.36
4. The Implications for Religious Organizations
The first scenario-where the court finds the writer as the author of
the work-arguably is the best for religious organizations, as it provides
a strong copyright to the work. Nevertheless, even in this "winning situa-
tion," religious organizations partially lose: the "divine authorship" they
claim never can be recognized. Furthermore, at least one scholar has
proposed a sensible rule that would disfavor claims of religious author-
ship at all.' 7 Scholars, of course, are not judges, and currently the law
309. Id. (quoting Letter from Oscar ichazo, in LETTERS TO THE SCHOOL 9 (Arica Insti-
tute Press ed., 1988)).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor (NCCFE),
No. 96-4126, 2000 WL 1028634, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000), vacated, No. 96-4126, 2004
WL 906301 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 27, 2004).
313. Id.
314. Id. ("Plaintiffs' statements of belief that Jesus dictated the Course to Schucman do
not make the Course a factual work.").
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Cotter has opined that the current treatment of divine authorship is misguided and,
essentially, amounts to a declaration that divine claims of authorship are false. Cotter, Guten-
berg's Legacy, supra note 20, at 343-44. For that reason, he has advocated that courts avoid
deciding any religious aspect of a claim by employing "[a] default rule against copyrightability."
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allows religious organizations to claim divine authorship and still receive
a copyright.
The latter two scenarios-copyrightable compilations and factual es-
toppel-represent stumbling blocks for religious organizations. Factual
estoppel is a doctrine that prevents a plaintiff, who represents the work at
issue as factual (or "scientifically proveable"), from claiming the work is
an original, nonfactual, and copyrightable one." 8 If factual estoppel ap-
plies, then the work is generally not protected at all.3 9 Although a party
may argue that its "factual work" is original in its selection or arrange-
ment, these claims will fail because the plaintiff has previously argued
against the originality of the work and thus failed to raise this issue. 2 0 In
that case, religious organizations cannot use copyright law to censor oth-
ers or preserve doctrinal purity.
Additionally, if the court holds that the work constitutes a copyright-
able compilation, the resulting copyright is "thin. 32' In other words,
Id. at 344. This rule "does not entail acceptance of the claim of divine authorship, but rather
allows the court to remain neutral." Id. He states:
[I]f the claim of divine authorship is true, the human intermediary is not an author,
and therefore the work lacks copyright protection; but if the claim is false, then...
the human intermediary should be barred, under either the doctrine of unclean
hands or copyright estoppel, from subsequently asserting authorship of the work.
Since the result is the same either way, the court need not indulge in any theological
speculation in order to determine the copyright status of the work.
Id. Thus, to summarize, Cotter argues that, when it comes to divine authorship,
Either the claim of supernatural authorship is true, or at least sincere, in which case
a supernatural being authored the work, and the work is not subject to copyright
protection; or the claim is false, and the human author should be estopped from
later asserting her own authorship of the work. In either case, the work is not copy-
rightable, and courts should be spared the difficult-and probably
unconstitutional-task of deciding the validity of the human author's revelation.
Id. at 353.
318. See Arica Institute v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the
doctrine of estoppel barred the plaintiff's claim of copyrightability as to certain aspects of a
work after it "represented to the world that [its] claims [were] factual," and then argued, "[o]n
appeal.... that its statements [were] only metaphoric claims of philosophical truth").
319. Religious organizations are still free to argue, as the plaintiff in Arica did unsuc-
cessfully, that the arrangement or sequence of facts is original. Id. at 1076-77; but see infra
note 320.
320. E.g., Oliver v. Saint German Foundation, 41 F. Supp. 296, 299 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
Note that if factual estoppel applies, it means that the plaintiff, after representing the work as
factual, then commits herself, in litigation, to the position that the work is not factual in na-
ture. As a result, this generally will preclude a claim of originality based on selection or
arrangement. This is because the party to whom factual estoppel applies never will have made
the alternative argument that its work was factual. If it had, then factual estoppel would not
apply in the first instance.
321. E.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating
that "the copyright in a factual compilation is thin").
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because copyright protection applies only to the selection and arrange-
ment of the work, it cannot protect anything more than that. The words
and phrases in isolation are freely appropriable, That means that reli-
gious organizations will have a difficult time preventing others from
using any part of the work-a claim of infringement likely will exist
only as to verbatim copying of the arrangement, thereby hampering their
ability to censor others and to preserve doctrinal purity.
B. The Merger Doctrine
In addition to originality, the merger doctrine erects further hurdles
for religious organizations seeking to censor and maintain doctrinal pu-
rity. Laypeople commonly assert they have an "idea" they want to
"copyright." Much to these people's frustration, the Copyright Act pro-
hibits such protection.2  Of course, copyrighted materials can contain
ideas-but copyright law does not protect them. 23 What it protects in-
stead is the expression of those ideas. 24
The merger doctrine-which either is a defense to copyright in-
fringement or a rule that precludes copyright protection 32 5-applies
322. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
323. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 56-57 (1976) (stating that "[c]opyright does not preclude
others from using the ideas or information revealed by the author's work").
324. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.") (emphasis added);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) ("The copyright protects originality rather than
novelty or invention-conferring only 'the sole right of multiplying copies.'") (emphasis
added) (quoting Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 94 (2d Cir. N.Y.
1922)). In Baker v. Selden, the plaintiff claimed copyright in a published book that described a
system of bookkeeping and displayed tables of the system used. 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1879).
Defendant reproduced a "similar plan . - . but [made] a different arrangement of the columns,
and [used] different headings." Id. The Court concluded that "whilst no one has a right to print
or publish his book, or any material part thereof, as a book intended to convey instruction in
the art, any person may practise and use the art itself which he has described and illustrated
therein." Id. at 104. The Court went on to note the confusion between ideas and expressions:
"The plausibility of the claim put forward by the complainant in this case arises from a confu-
sion of ideas produced by the peculiar nature of the art described in the books which have
been made the subject of copyright." Id. The court held the expression of the idea as copy-
right-protected. Id. at 105.
325. Professor David Nimmer has noted that some courts have held that the merger doc-
trine is a defense to infringement while others have stated that it renders a work
uncopyrightable. He endorses the former approach because it "[evaluates] the inseparability of
idea and expression in the context of a particular dispute, rather than attempting to disqualify
certain expressions from protection per se." DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03[BI[3] (2009) (citations omitted).
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where an idea can be expressed in a limited number of ways.326 Thus,
where there is "essentially" only one way to express an idea, the defen-
dant is free to copy that idea (or expression)3 27 ad infinitum and without
restriction.325 Where, however, the idea and the expression are not com-
pletely inseparable, but the idea can be expressed only a limited number
of ways, "the burden of proof is heavy on the plaintiff who may have to
show 'near identity' between the works at issue.
The merger doctrine presents problems for religious organizations
seeking to censor others or preserve doctrinal purity. Many religious
doctrines subsist in a text; but not all of them require precise and exact
copying to reproduce the ideas they embody. At the very least, some
variant of the idea contained in the text can be reproduced as a different
expression. And, since copyright law protects only expressions, religious
organizations will have difficulty protecting their doctrines or censoring
others. In this way, the merger doctrine prevents religious organizations
from achieving their two primary goals of using copyright law.
Although this doctrine, generally speaking, makes achieving reli-
gious goals difficult, it may facilitate infringement claims in cases where
verbatim copying exists. The NCCFE and Lerma H cases illustrate how
this happens. In NCCFE, the court held that the merger doctrine did not
apply to the plaintiff's text because "a brief glance through the Course
reveals that the same or remarkably similar ideas are restated continually
in a myriad of ways. '3 3 Therefore, "these ideas could be further restated
in an endless variety of forms. 33'
326. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606-07 (1st
Cir. 1988) (stating that "[slome ideas admit of only a limited number of expressions" and also
appearing to endorse Nimmer's preferred approach that, in such a case, "copyright is no bar to
copying that expression" and later stating that "[clonversely, of course, 'as a work embodies
more in the way of particularized expression, it moves further away from [merger of idea and
expression] and receives broader copyright protection'") (quoting Atari, Inc. v. North Am.
Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982)).
327. Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 136 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) ("It
is of course true that similarity which necessarily results from the replication of an idea will
not support a finding of infringement."). This is the same as saying that the defendant is free to
copy the merged expression-after all, the idea and the expression have merged. Because they
are inseparable, either may be copied.
328. See Coquico, Inc. v. Rodrfquez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2009) (taking the
approach Nimmer rejects, stating that "the merger doctrine denies copyright protection when
creativity merges with reality; that is, when there is only one way to express a particular
idea."); Mattel, 365 F.3d at 136 n.3.
329. Concrete Mach. Co., 843 F2d at 606. Nimmer has called the First Circuit's rule "a
questionable extension of the merger doctrine." Nimmer, supra note 325, at § 13.03[B][3]
(2009).
330. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor (NCCFE),
No. 96-4126, 2000 WL 1028634, at * 19 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000), vacated, No. 96-4126, 2004
WL 906301 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 27, 2004).
331. Id.
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The court in Lerma H reached the same conclusion. There, the de-
fendant argued that the merger doctrine applied to COS materials
because "Hubbard describes the [works] as primarily factual, and he in-
sists that their contents must be followed exactly as written."" 2 The court
rejected this argument, stating the "voluminous record... and... [the]
parties' numerous briefs" demonstrated that "[t]he ideas and concepts of
the Scientology religion can be discussed independently of the
[works]." 3" The court also suggested that religious texts generally will
not fall within the confines of the merger doctrine because "theological
musings on the sources of (and remedies for) spiritual harm have domi-
nated discussion about religion for centuries," and "spiritual healing is
clearly not a concept inherently tied to the [copyrighted works].""
4
Despite the inapplicability of the merger doctrine in cases like
NCCFE and Lerma I!, the resulting infringement liability does not en-
tirely serve the core goals of religious organizations. This follows from
how doctrinal distortions arise. It is more likely than not that an individ-
ual who copies a text verbatim will not distort religious doctrine. " ' And
when the individual does not copy the text verbatim but instead para-
phrases the ideas, that noninfringing writing is more likely to distort
religious doctrine.
In some ways, then, the merger doctrine can, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, facilitate infringement claims and concomitantly foster distortions.
Even so, because the merger doctrine did not apply in NCCFE and
Lerma II, the defendant was prohibited from copying the text verbatim.
Although the merger doctrine may limit verbatim copying and encourage
distortions of religious ideas, it cannot prevent all uses of quotations."6
One court has noted that quoting may often be necessary to ensure accu-
racy, stating that "quoting modestly for the purposes of making accurate
rendition of an idea commented upon in the critical work" is a "strong
justification.""3 7 In cases where an individual seeks to pass judgment on
certain ideas, "it behooves [the author] to set forth those ideas accu-
rately. 338 In these ways, copyright law actually provides, rather than
332. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma It), No. 95-1107, 1996 WL 633131, at *3
(E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Or, at the very least, verbatim copying reduces the risk of the quoted passage's
distortion. In any case, it seems fair to say that verbatim copying of religious work is less
likely to result in a distortion than a general discussion of the work itself.
336. See infra Part III.D-E.
337. See New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1518 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
338. Id.
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prevents, opportunities for transmogrification of the ideas contained in
religious texts.
Before exiting the merger-doctrine discussion, one final comment is
in order. Thomas Cotter has noted that because "courts apply the
[merger] doctrine only when the need to access the text in haec verba is
(more or less) universal[,] ... [t]he doctrine does not apply when most
users could get by with a paraphrase, even though for some class of us-
ers access to the exact text is necessary.' 3 39 This is relevant because there
are cases where, "in the minds of its believers[,] no paraphrased text
would be an adequate substitute for the original," or where "a defendant
has a compelling need to access a specific text in order to make its point
most effectively."'  Cotter calls these cases "partial merger[s].-'' 4 Some
religions may regard the idea as inseparable from the expression. For
Cotter and others, this raises the question: what should the law do when,
for a subgroup, the idea and the expression are inseparable? Cotter states
that "courts should consider accommodating the latter class through fair
use or, perhaps better, by means of a liability rule."' 2
But this Article's answer is different: it advocates the destruction of
any "partial merger" or contextual analysis of the merger doctrine.W The
fact that a particular group views the idea and the expression as insepa-
rable does not make them so. The law evaluates such questions as
objectively as possible. Cultural theorists, of course, will debate whether
such an objective view is in fact possible.3  I submit that they are, at
least in the sense that the decision-maker should not try to "stand in the
shoes" of the subgroup asserting inseparability. If this was legally im-
possible, then many legal inquiries would fail.
C. Substantial Similarity
Beyond originality and the merger doctrine, copyright law doctrine
provides more hoops through which religious organizations must jump
to censor others and preserve the purity of their doctrines. Among these
hoops is substantial similarity, a doctrine used to prove "non-literal in-
339. Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcernent, 93 IowA L. REV.
1271, 1298 n.74 (2008).
340. Id. at 1298.
341. Id. at 1298 n.74.
342. Id. See, e.g., Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312
F.3d 94, 96, 98 (2d Cir. 2002) (arguing that exact duplication of a translated Jewish prayer-
book was necessary to practice the religion and contending that "copyright law does not
permit the monopolization of the recommended form of a religious prayer").
343. See Heinss, supra note 22, at 680-81 (articulating a neutral stance to religious
copyright claims).
344. See, e.g., Rotstein, supra note 256, at 727, 728-42.
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fringement"-that is, infringement where the exact text is not copied:
To determine if a plaintiff has successfully shown that its work and the
defendant's work are "substantially similar,' 346 the court undertakes a
two-part inquiry:3
7
First, the court must determine whether the two works are "ex-
trinsically similar because they contain substantially similar
ideas that are subject to copyright protection." And second, the
court must ask whether the works are "intrinsically similar" in
the sense that they express those ideas in a substantially similar
manner from the perspective of the intended audience of the
work. -4 8
Extrinsic similarity requires similarity between the "ideas that are sub-
ject to copyright protection., 349 The assessment of extrinsic similarity is
based on objective criteria, such as access to the works, the identity of
the works' titles, as well as objective similarities between plot and
theme, for example.O Intrinsic similarity refers to manner in which
those ideas are expressed-it looks to the "total concept and feel" of the
works:. Intrinsic similarity should be assessed from the standpoint of
the "ordinary observer.' 32 Typically the ordinary observer will be the
3131public at large: Where, however, the copyrighted work is intended for a
345. To prove a claim of nonliteral infringement, the plaintiff must prove both access
and substantial similarity. Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th
Cir. 2001) (stating that, "when the plaintiff possesses no direct evidence that the defendant
copied its protected work, it may create a presumption of copying by indirect evidence estab-
lishing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the defendant's work is
'substantially similar' to the protected material").
346. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946) ("In some cases,
the similarities between the plaintiff's and defendant's work are so extensive and striking as,
without more, both to justify an inference of copying and to prove improper appropriation.");
see also Lyons P'ship, 243 F.3d at 801 (describing ways of establishing substantial similarity).
347. There are several analytical approaches to substantial similarity other than the one
recited here. NIMMER, supra note 325, at § 13 (2009) (describing "comprehensive nonliteral
similarity," "fragmented literal similarity," and the tests developed within each, as well as
describing how to "negate" similarity): Nancy E. Wolff, Special Problems Concerning Visual
Works, 932 PRACTISINg; L. INST. 379, 394-405 (2008) (reviewing the different approaches to
substantial similarity).
348. Lyons P'ship, 243 F.3d at 801 (citation omitted).
349. Id.
350. See Shaw v. Lidheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356, 1362-64 (9th Cir. 1990).
351. Lyons P'ship, 243 F.3d at 801 (quoting Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d
731,733 (4th Cir. 1990)).
352. Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that the intrinsic test is a "subjective assessment of
substantial similarity"-that is, a question of fact. Shaw v. Lidheim, 919 F.2d at 1359-60.
Thus, if a court finds that a work may satisfy the extrinsic test, it cannot find pass judgment on
the intrinsic test because it is a question for the trier of fact. Id. at 1358. Nimmer has criticized
this approach heavily. NiMMER, supra note 325, at § 13.03[E1[l] (2009).
353. Lyons P'ship, 243 F.3d at 801.
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particular audience, at least in the Fourth Circuit, "the court's inquiry
must be focused upon the perspectives of the persons who comprise that
group.' '
3-54
At first glance, this test may seem to provide religious organizations
with a weapon for protecting their doctrines and censoring others. After
all, because substantial similarity does not require literal infringement,
the scope of possible infringement widens, which, in turn, broadens the
range of meritorious claims a religious organization can make. The main
advantage this doctrine provides to religious organizations, however,
resides in their audience. Where a work is directed to a particular audi-
ence-in this case a religious audience-the substantial similarity test
uses the perspective of an ordinary observer in that religious audience.
Doubtless this gives religions more protection; a religious audience is
more likely to find works similar if they contain religious messages.
This nuance, however, can take claims of infringement only so far.
Critical biographies and explanatory or informative works likely will fall
outside the scope of infringement. 5 In other words, works produced for
nonreligious purposes likely will not be infringing. That is problematic
for religious organizations because they seek to censor all works that
may result in negative publicity or that represent opposition or dissent.
Furthermore, preservation of doctrine is not limited to other religious
works because nonreligious works also can adulterate a religious doc-
trine. Many of these works have a different "feel"-and in other cases a
decidedly unreligious feel-from the original works.
The substantial similarity doctrine can give rise to other problems, as
well. For example, in Religious Technology Center v. Scott,"5 6 the court
noted that the substantial similarity "inquiry is complicated by two char-
acteristics of the copyrighted material: (1) [the work] describes a process
or procedure which cannot itself be copyrighted, .. . and (2) [the work]
is alleged to be the sacred scripture of a religion."3" The court held that
neither of these features precluded a finding of copyrightability or in-
fringement, but they did make the analysis more difficult118 Although the
court concluded that the ideas in the two works "express[ed] substan-
tially the same idea," it declined to hold they were substantially similar
354. Id. This has been referred to as the "intended audience test." The Ninth Circuit has,
on at least one occasion, followed this approach. E.g., Aliotii v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898,
902 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the intended audience method under the "intrinsic test").
355. See, e.g., New Era Publn's Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1525-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("In the past, efforts to suppress critical biography through copyright injunc-
tion have generally not succeeded because courts (sometimes straining) have found fair use.").
356. 660 F. Supp. 515 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 971 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1992).
357. Id. at 518.
358. Id.
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under the intrinsic arm of the test, stating that a reasonable person would
not find "[the two works] substantially similar in expression*
3
1
9
Generally speaking, the doctrine of substantial similarity presents a
roadblock for religious organizations. Although the doctrine does not
require literal identity of the works, it still cannot protect the ideas con-
tained in the work. For that reason, it does not aid religious organizations
in their quests to maintain doctrinal purity and censor others.
D. Fair Use
Fair use is a doctrine in copyright law that allows individuals to use
an author's work without authorization and without recompensing the
author.360 The Copyright Act states that "fair use of a copyrighted work"
includes "reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), schol-
arship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. '36' The statute
also sets out four factors courts must employ "[i]n determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use":
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
362
Fair use presents a huge stumbling block for religion. Numerous articles
have analyzed courts' treatment of religious works under the fair use doc-
trine.63 The purpose of this Article is not to rehash these analyses, but only
to identify the problems the fair use doctrine causes for religious
359. Id. at 520.
360. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. E.g., Cotter, Accommodating the Unauthorized Use, supra note 20, passim; Cotter,
Gutenberg's Legacy, supra note 19, at 368-91; Jed Michael Silversmith & Jack Achiezer
Guggenheim, Between Heaven and Earth: The Interrelationship Between Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 467, 493-98
(2001); Wassom, supra note 69, at 206-39; Heinss, supra note 22, at 696, 699-701; Renae S.
Kelderman, Note, You Cannot Hide Behind Religion in Copyright Law: The Ninth Circuit
Correctly Rejected a Religious Extension to the Fair Use Defense in Worldwide Church of
God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1107 (2002).
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organizations seeking protection using copyright law. Fair use defeats
many of religious organizations' efforts to censor others. The Copyright
Act explicitly provides that individuals can copy a religious work (or any
other work) to, among other purposes, comment or criticize it.36 Reli-
gious organizations seeking to censor others have confronted the fair use
161
stumbling block with limited success.
The same can be said of these organizations' success when seeking
to maintain doctrinal purity. Religious organizations often seek copyright
as a means to protect anyone from using, commenting on, or otherwise
changing how a text reads. Fair use thwarts this effort by providing indi-
viduals with the right to use copyrighted works for various purposes.
These can include commenting on the material itself, or teaching it in
some way that may be "unauthorized" or incongruous with religious or-
ganizations' teachings or objectives.
CONCLUSION
This Article has identified and tracked religious organizations' moti-
vations for seeking copyright protection and for enforcing their
copyrights. These two motivations were identified as preserving the pu-
rity of religious doctrine and censoring others' use of religious works.
These motivations were then analyzed to determine whether they accord
with copyright law's underlying principles and substantive doctrine. Ul-
timately, this analysis showed that religious motivations conflict with
both the copyright's principles and its doctrine.
Part I explained the situations in which religious organizations may
seek copyright protection. It noted that, while religious organizations
seek copyright protection for a variety of reasons, the two most promi-
nent are a desire to censor others and a desire to maintain doctrinal
purity.
Part II explored the underlying justifications and principles of copy-
right law, examining the dissonance between these principles and
religious motivations for pursing copyright protection. First, this Part
364. 17 U.S.C. § 107. There are also general exemptions provided by the Copyright Act,
some of which apply in educational circumstances. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006). For a more de-
tailed analysis of how fair use applies in the educational context, see generally David A.
Simon, Teaching Without Infringement: A New Model for Educational Fair Use, 20 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 52 453 (2010).
365. See also Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1261 (2d Cir. 1986) (stat-
ing, ostensibly, that "[tlhe commission of errors in borrowing copyrighted material is a proper
ingredient to consider in making the fair use determination," but not using this factor, which
was "but one of many" because "as a judicial body, we consider it highly undesirable to hinge
a legal determination solely on the relative truth or accuracy of statements made in the context
of debate on a highly volatile social issue").
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delineated three theories of copyright law: economic theory, property
rights theory, and cultural theory. While examining these theories, this
Part analyzed whether the previously articulated religious motivations
for copyright protection comported or clashed with each one. It found
that the two primary reasons religious organizations seek copyright pro-
tection conflicted with nearly all aspects of these theories of copyright.
In other words, this Part concluded that copyright law's fundamental
principles conflict with religious motivations for seeking copyright pro-
tection.
Part III explored whether, despite this dissonance, religious organi-
zations could effectively employ copyright law to achieve their
objectives. To complete this analysis, this Part reviewed several copy-
right law doctrines, exploring how each doctrine interacted with the
religious motivations explored in Part I. Part III found that copyright law
was not up to the task, as its doctrines did not fully enable religious
groups to achieve their goals. As a result of the failures of copyright law
documented in Parts II and III, this Article concluded that copyright law
should not be used by religious organizations to achieve doctrinal purity
or censorship.
All of the aforementioned analysis has shown that religious organi-
zations sometimes use copyright law in a manner that conflicts with its
design and, in the process, confront numerous doctrinal hurdles that pre-
vent these organizations from achieving their objectives. This
fundamental conflict poses problems for religious organizations. More
importantly, however, it illustrates that religious organizations should
find other means to achieve their objectives. In other words, they should
not use copyright law to achieve doctrinal purity or censorship.
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